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Article 4

STEALING TRADE SECRETS ETHICALLY
DON WIESNER*
ANITA CAVA**

I.

INTRODUCTION

Is trade secret litigation an appropriate opportunity for policing
commercial morality? Many of the judges ruling on these cases
seem to say so. This article examines the trade secret cases of the
past eleven years for some evidence of how the courts apply the law
to monitor commercial morality.
If I take something tangible that you own, I am clearly a thief.
And many would agree that depriving you of the benefits of ownership-stealing-is immoral in most instances. But if I take your
ideas, knowledge, or information, you still have use of them. Society may actually benefit if we share knowledge. So in the realm of
ideas, am I so clearly a thief and is my taking so clearly wrong and
unfair?1
This central question stimulates an examination of the ethical
aspects, or "fairness," of trade secret principles and their application by the courts. Frequent judicial comments about morality expressed in trade secret decisions invite such an examination. The
decisions today reflect this common theme when dealing with trade
secret questions:
The protection which we afford to trade secrets against
one who wrongfully uses them is grounded on principles of
public policy to which we have adhered since Peabody v.
Norfolk, 98 Mass. 452, 457 (1868): "It is the policy of the
law, for the advantage of the public, to encourage and protect invention and commercial enterprise." This encouragement and protection is afforded trade secrets because
the public has a manifest interest not only in commercial
innovation and development, but also in2 "[t]he mainte'
nance of standards of commercial ethics.
Chairman and Professor, Department of Business Law, University of Miami.
J.D., University of Miami, 1953; LL.M., 1961.
** Assistant Professor, Department of Business Law, University of Miami.

B.A.,

Swarthmore College, 1975;J.D., New York University, 1978.
1. This question is asked and discussed in R. DEGEORGE, BUSINESS ETnIcs 291 (2d
ed. 1986).
2. Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 377 Mass. 159, 166-67, 385 N.E.2d 1349,
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Undoubtedly, courts believe that ethical standards are of some
assistance in applying trade secret principles, particularly in cases of
first impression. The court in E.L DuPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher,' the frequently cited "spy in the sky" case, expressly acknowledged as much. The defendant was the pilot of an airplane .(the
"cloak") carrying a photographer (with'the camera as the "dagger")
on a mission of apparent industrial espionage. The flight took the
airplane over the site of a plant being built by the plaintiff. The
plaintiff had secured the site intending to prevent others from discovering certain aspects of the process of producing methanol. In
ruling against the spy, the court cautioned those who litigate trade
secrets that the law introduces "here no new or radical ethic since
our ethos has never given moral sanction to piracy [and that] [tlhe
market place must not deviate far from our mores. "14
The authors respond to the implied invitation to examine ethics
in trade secrets cases. 5 We examine trade secret decisions of the
past eleven years' in light of ethical principles to discover whether
trade secret law serves a reasoned public policy accounting for the
equities of not only the parties but society itself.
II.

LEGAL AND ETHICAL THEFt

A.

Background

Information, techniques, knowledge, data, formulas, processes,
machinery, and the like are vital parts of many businesses. Gathering such information and techniques is frequently time consuming
and expensive, and the law honors this effort and cost by declaring
1354-55 (1979) (Abrams, J.) (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
481 (1974) (footnotes omitted)).
3. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024, reh gdenied, 401 U.S.
967 (1971).
4. Id. at 1016-17.
5. The authors assume a narrow invitation and respond in kind; this article considers only trade secret law. The trade secret claimant frequently relies on more to make a
case. Many companies employ covenants not to compete and other restrictive agreements to protect business interests against contractors, suppliers, and other outsiders,
as well as employees. For a thorough review of the role of trade secrets within the bundle of such techniques, see Robison, The Confidence Game: An Approach to the Law About
Trade Secrets, 25 ARIz. L. REV. 347 (1983).
6. Those cases decided in the years 1976 through 1987 were examined, with particular attention and notation here for those opinions that disclosed to the authors some
insight into the public policy or ethical aspects of the trade secret issue. Some of the
cases cited were on the federal district court level, yet revealed, even in cases where the
appropriateness of a temporary injunction was in issue, some insight into the public
policy considerations before the court.
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certain information and techniques "trade secrets." If a trade secret
is improperly obtained, a court will award damages and an injunction to the party claiming ownership of it. 7 The improper appropriation of a trade secret involves the tort of conversion. Nevertheless,
courts split over this tort theory, disagreeing about whether trade
secrets should be treated under a "property view" or a "confidential
relationship view." 8 Accordingly, the reader of many opinions finds
"[t]hat the legal basis affording relief consists of a conglomerate of
property, agency, tort, and contract law [as well as] on the concept
of equity." 9
The elements of the action are fairly well acknowledged. In order to qualify as a trade secret, the knowledge or information, sometimes specifically described as "any formula, pattern, or compilation
of information," 0 must not be generally known or readily ascertainable, must provide a demonstrable advantage in business, and must
have been gained at the expense of the owner who intended to keep
it confidential."' Generally speaking, each element must be proven.
The definition of trade secret, however, is elusive "because it includes a wide spectrum of categories subject to variations depending upon the facts of a particular case."' 2 The result is considerable
variation and even confusion in judicial handling of this cause of
action.
There is legitimate reason for confusion. The source of most
judicial thought on the definition of a trade secret is the Restatement
of Torts (Restatement) section 757, which basically sets out the elements stated above. The comments under the heading of "secrecy," however, also list six factors courts should use to gauge the
7. See, e.g., E. KITNER, AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW PRIMER (2d ed. 1982); 1 R.
MILGRIM, TRADE SECRETS § 7.08 (1987); see also Note, All the King's Horses-Irreparable
Harm in Trade Secret Litigation, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 804 (1984) (discussing injunctive
relief and the problems associated with proving irreparable harm).
8. See Lemelson v. Carolina Enters., Inc., 541 F. Supp. 645, 659 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
See also Note, supra note 7, at 808-15 (advocating the "property view" and arguing that
"liability for the breach of a confidential relationship should be treated under the law of
agency, not the law of trade secrets.").
9. Engineered Mechanical Servs. v. Langlois, 424 So. 2d 329, 333 (La. App. 1984),
cert. denied, 467 So. 2d 531 (La. 1985) (quoting Comment, 11isappropriationof Trade Secrets,
53 TUL. L. REV. 215, 222-23 (1978)).
10. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939)..
11. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 898 (Minn.
1983) (citing Cherne Indus., Inc. v. Grounds & Assocs., Inc., 278 N.W.2d 81, 90 (Minn.
1979) (adopting the four-point test of RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939) to define a
trade secret)).
12. American Wheel & Eng'g Co. v. Dana Molded Prods., Inc., 132 Ill.
App. 3d 205,
209, 476 N.E.2d 1291, 1294 (1985).
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extent to which the required elements are met.' 3 These guidelines
leave much to judicial discretion, with the result being very uneven
applications of the parameters. As one dissenting judge recently
complained, "the majority incorrectly assumes that each factor ...
must be treated independently ... [and] be weighed equally." The
more reasoned approach, he argued, would be to balance the factors "in light of commercial realities." 4 In effect, judges rely on
their intuition in many cases, as the result can be easily justified by
manipulating the elements of the tort or the Restatement's factors.
The Uniform Trade Secret Act' 5 represents a recent effort to
codify trade secret law and to minimize some of the difficulties
courts experience. The Act more specifically defines trade secrets to
include methods, techniques and other "know-how" and requires
that they be kept secret by "efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances."' 6 Courts still are perplexed, however. Shortly after
Minnesota adopted the Act, the state supreme court interpreted the
secrecy provision to require not just an "intention" to keep information secret, as may have been sufficient under the Restatement, but
actual manifestation of that intent.' 7 Reversing the trial court's finding that the claimant demonstrated the necessary intent, the court
criticized the company's security measures in light of its failure to
maintain an aura of confidentiality in the business, which the statute
does not appear to require.
These observations are relevant to our examination because the
legal elements form a barrier to identifying the public policy protecting certain ideas or thoughts. Simply put, the elements establishing a trade secret are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Is an
idea eligible for protection because it is valuable, because it is not
13. Courts should consider:
(1) the extent to which the information is known outside of [the claimant's]
business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved
in his business; (3) the extent of the measures taken by [the claimant] to guard
the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the information to [the claimant]
and to [the claimant's] competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by [the claimant] in developing the information; and (6) the ease or
difficulty with which the information could be properly acquired or duplicated
by others.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939).
14. Junkunc v. S.J. Advanced Technology & Mfg. Corp., 149 Ill. App. 3d 114, 12021, 498 N.E.2d 1179, 1184 (1986) (Jiganti, J., dissenting), appeal denied, 113 Ill. 2d 575,
505 N.E.2d 353 (1987). See also infra text accompanying notes 282-286.
15. Unif. Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. 29 (1985).
16. Id. § 1(4), 14 U.L'A. 332-33 (Supp. 1987).
17. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890, 901 (Minn.
1983).
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generally known, because one makes an effort to keep it secret, or
because others who learn of it are either bound in a confidential
relationship with the claimant or in some way misbehave in taking
the idea? Are these not separate strands of a single thread? Further, what role does independent discovery or reverse engineering,
called back-tracking, play in the balancing of interests? Because no
bright line isolates these elements, a certain circular reasoning pervades the cases. The analysis presented here assumes that the application of the elements of the cause of action does not always
manifest a consistent thrust. Therefore, this examination attempts
to penetrate judicial legalisms to arrive at an understanding ofjudicial decisionmaking as courts monitor commercial morality.
B.

Ethical Theft Defined

Ethically, theft is taking what belongs to others when they are
reasonably unwilling to part with it.' s Nearly all trade secret cases
involve the charge that one, usually a former employee or a contractor, has taken another's idea. Arguably, one may take from another
by self-help where a superior moral claim is pressed. An example
involving business conduct is where a grossly underpaid employee
has no other opportunity to support his or her family except
through his or herjob. The employee "raises" his or her salary by
self-help--stealing the employer's goods. The ethicist would evaluate the "reasonably unwilling" element of the definition and consider the worker's need to preserve his or her life as canceling to a
certain extent the employer's ownership claim.'" Of course, the
taker of the trade secret does not qualify in such a desperate way,
but then the possessor of the trade secret may have a significantly
weaker ownership claim.
Trade secret issues are subtle and contain a number of interesting aspects, including stolen "ideas" as the subject matter of the
theft rather than a fair salary. Trade secret cases are "stolen ideas"
cases instituted by plaintiffs against others who have taken or used
what the plaintiffs believe to be exclusively theirs. Frequently,
claimants press that their property rights have been disturbed. Unlike the legaf claims, however, ethical rights in property are not always simply validated, particularly when claims are made for such
18. T. GARRETT, BUSINESS ETHICS 102 (1966); W. COLLINS, ETHICS 109 (1947).
19. The ethicists usually supply more life-threatening examples as where one is in
"extreme need, (i.e. in very great danger of losing such goods as life, a limb or an eye)
and can save himself only by using a little of his neighbor's property, it would be unreasonable for that neighbor to object." W. COLLINS, supra note 18.
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intangibles as knowledge or information. Indeed, the ethicist might
view the alleged taker of a trade secret as a stand-in for society,
claiming a share of this valuable property.2 0 The "property rights"
question is always a difficult ethical issue, but it is only one issue
among several in trade secret cases. One also must consider the
ways in which the right was protected, the type of relationship between the alleged taker and claimed owner, and the conduct of the
taker or user.
The courts are not overly analytical in their pursuit of the ethical issue, but they espouse ethical intentions.
The law puts its imprimatur on fair dealing, good faith, and
fundamental honesty. Courts condemn conduct which fails
to reflect these minimum accepted moral values by penalizing such conduct whenever it occurs ....
"[I]t is simply the
difference between right and wrong, honesty and dishonesty, which is the touchstone in an issue of this kind."'"
Do courts realize these intentions? Are standards of fair dealing and good faith employed to formulate a reasoned public policy
upon which one may claim exclusive rights to certain business ideas
and reasonably refuse to share such secrets? The answers to these
questions call for ethical as well as legal analysis.
C. Ethical Methodology
In order to evaluate fairness, one needs guidelines. Ethics can
supply them through application of accepted analytical techniques.
Ethics is a "systematic attempt, through the use of reason to make
sense of our individual and social moral experience, in such a way as
to determine the rules that ought to govern human conduct and the
values worth pursuing in life." 2 2 Business ethics, on the other hand,
20. The right to obtain a patent is a precise issue that has been seriously considered
as a matter of public policy. See, e.g., I R. MILGRIM, supra note 7, § 8, at 8-3 to -4, and
cases cited therein. The proprietary rights guaranteed under patent law have been
tuned or adjusted in keeping with the public's interest; a balancing of credits and debits
has been struck. See In re Sarkar, 575 F.2d 870, 872 (C.C.P.A. 1978) (balancing "the
triangular interests of the trade secret owner, the court as an institution, and the public"). The trade-off is public disclosure for the right of monopoly, but only for a limited
time. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 609 F. Supp. 1174, 1177 (C.D. Ill.
1985) (disclosure requirements of patent law are quid pro quo for monopoly). Trade secret law does not appear to have been considered from this point of view. See generally 1
R. MILGRIM, supra note 7, § 8.02.
21. USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener Corp., 379 Mass. 90, 104, 393 N.E.2d 895, 903
(1979) (quoting Seismograph Serv. Corp. v. Offshore Radist, Inc., 135 F. Supp. 342,
354-55 (E.D. La. 1955), modified on other grounds, 263 F.2d 5 (5th Cir. 1958)).
22. R. DEGEORGE, supra note 1, at 15.

1082

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 47:1076

are narrower but in focus only, being "concerned primarily with the
relationship of business goals and techniques to specifically human
ends."12 3 Ethics offers several methods of judging trade secret behavior. Two techniques for examining conduct could be the utilitarian, also known as the teleological or consequential, method and
the deontological approach. 4
Utilitarianism is an ethical theory holding that an action is right
if it produces, or if it tends to produce, the greatest amount of good
for the greatest number of people.2 5 The deontologists, however,
evaluate conduct independently of its consequences and offer a formalistic theory. As expressed by Immanuel Kant, a deontological
approach assumes that persons are autonomous moral entities who,
by practical reasoning, give to themselves moral law. Therefore,
moral action must be consistently universalizable, must respect rational beings as ends in themselves, and must stem from and respect
the autonomy of rational beings.2 6 Despite their standing as two
separate methods, employing utilitarianism and deontology to evaluate trade secret cases leads the practical observer to conclude that
in many instances the answers to a particular set of problems are
similar.
For purposes of ethical analysis, trade secret cases seem to demand two major inquiries: What type of material initially qualifies
as a trade secret-the "eligibility" question; and secondly, what conduct in the taking or using by the defendant is improper?

23. T. GARRET-r, supra note 18, at 4.
24. Current textbooks tend to include a treatment of the ethical aspects of law and
employ these two methods in evaluating the law and its underlying policies. For example, laws
sometimes have a deontological character.... [A] law making it illegal to bribe
foreign officials would be deontological. The bribing is condemned as wrong
and cannot be justified by such good consequences as increased revenue, employment, or profits. In contrast, a law making illegal careless manufacturing
of products that cause injury to consumers has somewhat of a teleological character. The negligent manufacturing is legally neutral, but when the consequences of this act are bad--consumer injury-the act becomes illegal.
E. CONRY, G. FERRERA & C. Fox, THE LEGAL ENVIRONMENT OF BUSINESS 23 (1986).
25. Utilitarians come in several varieties. Act utilitarians hold that in every situation
one ought to act so as to maximize the total good, even if doing so means breaking a
rule which, when obeyed, generally promotes the social good. Rule utilitarians obey the
rule even when "doing so does not lead to the best consequences, for the presence of
the rule itself and consistent adherence to it does promote the general welfare." W.
HOFFMAN &J. MOORE, BusINESs ETHics: READINGS AND CASES IN CORPORATE MORALITY
7 (1984).
26. R. DEGEORGE, supra note 1, at 67-68.
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THE TRADE SECRET AS A CONCEPT

A.

The Eligibility Issue

Is it a fair and good public policy that ideas and information are
the exclusive property of one person? Do not ideas and thoughts
belong to all? The deontologists would have difficulty approving of
a rule constructed so as to bar free thought, and they would demand
considerable pruning before finding it meets the tests of universality
and rationality. The reason for this pruning is evident when one
examines the legal and ethical posture of trade secret cases. The
facts of Electro-CraftCorp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc. 2 7 supply an appropriate prototype of party behavior and situational facts in trade secret cases.
In Electro-Craft the claimant corporation sued another company
and its president for misappropriating the designs of certain electric
motors.2 8 These designs were not patented, a not uncommon practice in the industry, leaving the claimant only trade secret rights
upon which to rely. 29 The president of the defendant company was
a former employee of the plaintiff company. Both companies made
high performance motors, called "servo motors," which are able to
start and stop at least thirty times per second. These motors are
useful for such high technology applications as computer disc drives
and printers, and industrial robots. The specific claim was theft of
one moving coil motor and one brushless motor. The trial court
found the defendants guilty of misappropriation, but the Supreme
Court of Minnesota reversed, in effect holding that the plaintiff had
failed to adequately protect its information and therefore had no
"trade secret" that could be stolen.3 0
This case provides the ethicist with an initial insight into a particularly fragile aspect of eligibility of an alleged trade secret: the
27. 332 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1983).
28. Id. at 893.
29. Id. at 901. The Commissioners' Prefatory Notes to the Uniform Trade Secrets
Act lend insight into why businesses choose trade secret protection over patent
protection:
A valid patent provides a legal monopoly for seventeen years in exchange for
public disclosure of an invention. If, however, the courts ultimately decide that
the Patent Office improperly issued a patent, an invention will have been disclosed to competitors with no corresponding benefit. In view of the substantial
number of patents that are invalidated by the courts, many businesses now elect
to protect commercially valuable information through reliance upon the state
law of trade secret protection.
Unif. Trade Secrets Act, 14 U.L.A. 29 (1985 & Supp. 1988).
30. Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 898-903.
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motors were developed from a certain base, a fact present in many
cases. Simply stated, the finished device cannot be said to be free of
certain equitable claims of society because, for purposes of ethical
evaluation, it is not a totally virgin creation. Instead, the device is
somewhat encumbered by the labor, genius, and ideas of its ancestors-an instance of the classic "sits on the shoulders of,others" indebtedness. 3 ' In this case, for example, moving coil motors have
been produced for many years, and development in another field,
the invention of newer and better adhesives, largely improved the
devices under review.3 ' Accordingly, not all moral credit goes to
the party who now possesses the process for the completed device
and vigorously urges trade secret protection.3 3 Are all such secrets
indebted by this possible moral claim? On this issue, examining different types of litigated trade secrets helps to determine whether all
business ideas have an equal claim to ownership.
B.

Types of Trade Secrets

In trade secret litigation, the subject matter or secret under judicial scrutiny can be viewed as falling into two broad categories:
(1) "technical or scientific processes," including recipes and products of a simpler nature such as board games; 4 and (2) what can be
classified as "other business information." The servo motors, the
subject of the inquiry in the Electro-Craft decision, represent the
character of the problem and the intensity of litigation involved in
protecting a technical or scientific process. These techniques or
processes usually lead to the creation of a product or service. The
other group of cases, those claiming protection of business information, frequently involve "customer lists" but also include a variety of
other claims for exclusive information such as business forms,3 5
31. A trade secretmay be based upon existing technology that has been improved by
"trial and effort and at considerable expense." Metallurgical Indus., Inc. v. Fourtek,
Inc., 790 F.2d 1195, 1202 (5th Cir. 1986) (quoting Ventura Mfg. Co. v. Locke, 454
S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tex. Ct. App. 1970)). Interestingly, the value of "negative knowhow"-knowing what not to do-is uncertain. At least one court has characterized the
value of negative know-how as integral to improvement and the equivalent of "positive
knowledge." Id. at 1203.
32. Electro-Craft, 332 N.W.2d at 898 n.6.
33. It is interesting to speculate upon why the Electro-Craftcourt offered this information in its opinion. Did the court sense the prior claim of society and was this an "ethical" factor in the negative decision for the claimants?
34. See, e.g., Burten v. Milton Bradley Co., 763 F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1985), rev'g, 592 F.
Supp. 1021 (D.R.I. 1984) (electronic board game).
35. American Nursing Care of Toledo, Inc. v. Leisure, 609 F. Supp. 419, 432 (N.D.
Ohio 1984) (finding that disclosure of franchisor's business forms to potential franchis-
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source material used in an investigative article, 6 and even data on
the attractiveness of a business opportunity."' The claimant here
presses that the business information is valuable for it gives the
claimant a competitive advantage, principally from a more efficient
operation. Technical or scientific information, on the other hand,
usually results in offering a product or service-a "better mousetrap"-which gives the claimant a competitive edge.
Obviously, the institution and prosecution of a lawsuit represents the claimant's judgment that the "trade secret" is of business
value. The reason for this judgment is also obvious: the claimant
believes the secret affords a competitive advantage, one of the legal
elements in determining a trade secret. The moralist must test the
impact of that competitive advantage against the interests of society.
The test is whether guaranteeing exclusivity improves the general
good or only advances individual goals. Simply illustrated, a medical device that advances medical knowledge is directly beneficial to
society. On the other hand a customer list, a type of business information, reaps its value through permitting the claimant to compete
more efficiently in the marketplace. The latter is, to the moralist,
perhaps a somewhat lesser contribution or indirect benefit to society. Viewed this way, the rule utilitarian might look to the good and
evil flowing from the enforcement of a trade secret claim. Honoring
the proposed division suggested here, let us first examine the technical or scientific process cases in this light.
1. Technical or Scientific Process Cases.-The researcher might
look at the trade secret cases of the past eleven years and attempt to
rank the claimed secret ordinally as to eligibility using a "direct benefit to society" test. For example, the servo motor described in
Electro-Craft is of some direct value to society by reason of its technical improvement, which assists many other products. But it also
could be considered to have lesser social value than an extrusion
blow-molding process used in the production of cuffed endotracheal
tubes, 8 which are used in operations to administer a mixture of oxees prior to execution of franchise agreement and unpoliced use during normal course
of business caused forms to be in public domain and therefore unprotectable as trade
secret).
36. Peckarsky v. American Broadcasting Co., 603 F. Supp. 688, 697 (D.D.C. 1984)
(finding "frivolous" plaintiff's claim that his news article or the information it contained
constituted a trade secret).
37. Lehman v. Dow Jones & Co., 783 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1986). See infra text accompanying notes 114-118.
38. See Sheridan v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1347, 1352 (N.D.N.Y. 1983)
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ygen and anesthesia. Surveying the cases under study, a listing
could be broken into three categories: drawings, devices, formulas,
or processes involving (1) a direct health benefit; (2) technology advancement; and (3) product innovation. Claimed trade secrets in
the direct health benefit category included: contact lens material, 9
a dental appliance,40 endotracheal tubes, 4 ' hypodermic needles,4 2
pesticides,4 3 and a respiratory device.4 4
Claimed trade secrets in the technology advancement category
included: an assembly line lawn trimmer,4 5 a beverage dispenser,4 6
blind rivets,4 7 circuit clip ring assemblies, 48 coil brace parts, 4 9 a concrete mixer, 5° a construction design, 5 ' a distillation plant,5 2 a drill
part,53 electromagnetic properties of water,5 4 engine repair,5 5 fiberglass insulation, 56 industrial glue, 57 inertia welded connectors, 58 jet
62
6
inks, 59 key lock codes, 60 measurement tolerances, ' a military rifle,
(finding this process a trade secret due to manufacturer's protection of the process, the
competitive edge it gave the business, and its uniqueness in the marketplace).
39. Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Novicky, 745 F.2d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984), vacated on
othergrounds, 470 U.S. 1047 (1985), on remand, 767 F.2d 901 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied,
475 U.S. 1083 (1986).
. 40. Schumann v. IPCO Hosp. Supply Corp., 93 111.App. 3d 1053, 418
N.E.2d 161
(1981). See also infra text accompanying notes 294-296.
41. Sheridan v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 568 F. Supp. 1347 (N.D.N.Y. 1983).
42. Affiliated Hosp. Prods., Inc. v. Baldwin, 57 Ill. App. 3d 800, 373 N.E.2d 1000
(1978), appeal after remand, 79 Ill. App. 3d 74, 398 N.E.2d 290 (1979).
43. Eli Lilly & Co. v. EPA, 615 F. Supp. 811 (S.D. Ind. 1985).
44. Laurie Visual Etudes, Inc. v. Chesebrough-Pond's Inc., 83 A.D.2d 505, 441
N.Y.S.2d 88 (1981). For additional discussion of the case, see infra text accompanying
notes 197 & 198.
45. Weed Eater, Inc. v. Dowling, 562 S.W.2d 898 (Tex. Ct. App. 1978).
46. Jet Spray Cooler, Inc. v. Crampton, 377 Mass. 159, 385 N.E.2d 1349 (1979).
47. USM Corp. v. Marson Fastener Corp., 379 Mass. 90, 393 N.E.2d 895 (1979).
48. Electro-Miniatures Corp. v. Wendon Co., 771 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1985).
49. Reinforced Molding Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 1083 (W.D. Pa.
1984).
50. Sims v. MackTrucks, Inc., 463 F. Supp. 1068 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
51. Interox v. PPG Indus., 736 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1984).
52. Koch Eng'g Co. v. Faulconer, 227 Kan. 813, 610 P.2d 1094 (1980).
53. Drill Parts & Serv. Co. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 439 So. 2d 43 (Ala. 1983).
54. Demit of Venezuela v. Electronic Water Sys., Inc., 547 F. Supp. 850 (S.D. Fla.
1982), aff'd, 740 F.2d 977 (11th Cir. 1984).
55. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Edel-Brown Tool & Die Co., 381 Mass. 1, 407 N.E.2d.
319 (1980).
56. Johns-Manville Corp. v. Guardian Indus., 586 F. Supp. 1034 (E.D. Mich. 1983).
57. In re Innovative Constr. Sys., Inc., 793 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1986). See also infra text
accompanying notes 270-276.
58. RTE Corp. v. Coatings, Inc., 84 Wis. 2d 105, 267 N.W.2d 226 (1978). For additional discussion of the case, see infra text accompanying notes 222-225.
59. American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 728 F.2d 818 (7th Cir.) afftg, 216 U.S.P.Q
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modeling rivers on a computer, 63 a monolith impregnator,' filters, 6 5 plastic compounds, 6 6 quartz crystals, 67 refrigerator coils, 68 a
ring design,6 9 a rotational molding process,70 servo motors,7 ' steam
turbine repair,7 2 a suntan product, 73 temperature ranges, 7 4 vinyllaminated wood, 75 a winding machine, 7 6 and an airplane window
design. 7
Claimed trade secrets in the product innovation category included: chocolate chip cookies,7 8 an electronic board game,79 an
entertainer robot,8 ° a mixed drink recipe, 8 I Ching cards,8 2 liquid
(BNA) 1094 (E.D. Wis. 1982). See also American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314
(7th Cir. 1984). See also infra notes 230-233 and accompanying text.
60. Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1982). See also infra text
accompanying notes 319-323.
61. Rexnord, Inc. v. Ferris, 55 Or. App. 127, 637 P.2d 619 (1981), rev'd on other
grounds, 294 Or. 392, 657 P.2d 673 (1983).
62. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 609 F. Supp. 1174 (C.D. Ill. 1985).
63. In re Sarkar, 575 F.2d 870 (C.C.P.A. 1978).
64. Ancraft Prods. Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 84 Ill. App. 3d 836, 405 N.E.2d
1162 (1980).
65. Delta Filter Corp. v. Morin, 108 A.D.2d 991, 485 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1985).
66. Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Novicky, 745 F.2d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984), vacated on
other grounds, 470 U.S. 1047, on remand, 767 F.2d 901 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475
U.S. 1083 (1986).
67. Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 606 F. Supp. 38 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd, 787 F.2d 655
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
68. Neil & Spencer Holdings Ltd. v. Kleen-Rite, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 164 (E.D. Mo.
1979).
69. Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. 1982). See
also infra text accompanying notes 297-298 and 301-302.
70. Rototron Corp. v. Lake Shore Burial Vault Co., 553 F. Supp. 691 (E.D. Wis.
1982), aff'd, 712 F.2d 1214 (7th Cir. 1983).
71. Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1983).
For a discussion of the case, see supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text, and infra text
accompanying notes 278-281.
72. Engineered Mechanical Servs., Inc. v. Langlois, 464 So. 2d 329 (La. App. 1984),
cert. denied, 467 So. 2d 531 (La. 1985).
73. Turner v. Great Am. Opportunities, Inc., 716 S.W.2d 40 (Tenn. App. 1986).
74. Andrea Dumon, Inc. v. Pittway Corp., 110 Il1. App. 3d 481, 442 N.E.2d 574
(1982).
75. Permagrain Prods., Inc. v. U.S. Mat & Rubber Co., 489 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa.
1980).
76. Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool & Die Co., 485 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
77. Boeing Co. v. Sierracin Corp., 108 Wash. 2d 38, 738 P.2d 665 (1987).
78. Peggy Lawton Kitchens, Inc. v. Hogan, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 937, 466 N.E.2d 138
(1984). For a discussion of the case, see infra notes 170-174 and accompanying text.
79. Burten v. Milton Bradley Co., 763 F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1985), rev , 592 F. Supp.
1021 (D.R.I. 1984). See also infra notes 244-251 and accompanying text.
80. Elnicky Enters. v. Spotlight Presents, Inc., 213 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 855 (S.D.N.Y.
1981). See also infra text accompanying notes 324-330.
81. Mason v. Jack Daniel Distillery, 518 So. 2d 130, cert. denied, No. 86-1630 (Ala.
1987).
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smoke,83 a toy extruder, 84 a toy noise maker,85 and two-tone sinks., 6
The ideas for which legal validation as trade secrets were
sought have been quite varied. Of the forty-eight technical-scientific
process subjects listed above, only four failed the eligibility test in
the courts. One of these, the high efficiency particulate air filter
production process8 7 also floundered judicially on other grounds
such as inadequate security, patent law implications, and application
of the reverse engineering rule.88 The remaining three ideas not
qualifying were a computer program setting designs for class
rings, 89 certain temperature ranges for a depilatory,90 and information regarding certain quartz crystals.9" From a moral or public policy point of view, these four ideas for processes or techniques are.
not otherwise distinguishable as less or more worthy than their companion ideas under litigation.
2. Other Business Information.-The majority of the reported
trade secret decisions of the past eleven years involved claims for
the protection of technical or scientific ideas whose application resulted in identifiable products or services. Nonetheless, "other business information" cases also were litigated in substantial numbers.
Within this class, "customer list" cases shared equal billing with a
variety of other types of general business information.
In customer list cases, the claimant faces the ethicist's strongest
charge against eligibility for exclusivity-selfishness. Arguably, a
customer list is of no direct benefit to anyone but the gatherer.
Moreover, the information probably is taken from data within the
public domain. Simply asked, on what moral ground does the
claimant demand exclusivity for a list of persons who are likely to
82. Walker v. University Books, Inc., 602 F.2d 859 (9th Cir. 1979).
83. Hickory Specialties, Inc. v. B&L Laboratories, Inc., 592 S.W.2d 583 (Tenn. App.
1979). For further discussion of the case, see infra notes 175, 179-180 and accompanying text.
84. Boggild v. Kenner Prods., 576 F. Supp. 533 (S.D. Ohio 1983), rev'd, 776 F.2d
1315 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 908 (1986).
85. Lemelson v. Carolina Enters., Inc., 541 F. Supp. 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
86. Eastern Marble Prods. Corp. v. Roman Marble, Inc., 372 Mass. 835, 364 N.E.2d
799 (1977). For additional discussion of the case, see infra notes 227-229 and accompanying text.
87. Delta Filter Corp. v. Morin, 108 A.D.2d 991, 485 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1985).
88. Id. at 993, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 145.
89. Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. 1982).
90. Andrea Dumon, Inc. v. Pittway Corp., 110 Ill. App. 3d 481, 442 N.E.2d 574
(1982).
91. Gilson v. Republic of Ireland, 606 F. Supp. 38 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd, 787 F.2d 655
(D.C. Cir. 1986).
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buy the product or service? The claimant defends its possessory
posture in several ways. In the first place, the list-makes the company more competitive and thereby able to provide the product or
service at a lower cost, hire more employees, and pay them better.
That is, of course, if the claimant is inclined to behave so-altruistically. Secondly, time, money, and effort have been spent in creating
the list; therefore, the claimant is entitled to the fruits of his or her
labor. Thirdly, because customer lists add nothing directly to society in general, exclusivity hardly diminishes mankind and no poor
moral marks can be assigned the claimant for seeking legal exclusivity. This last contention perversely presses a better claim for eligibility than those claimants for ideas of a technical or scientific
nature. Chief Justice Burger, speaking in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp., agreed: "Also, it is hard to see how the public would be benefited by disclosure of customer lists or advertising campaigns; in
fact, keeping such items secret encourages businesses to initiate new
and individualized plans of operation, and constructive competition
results. ' 9 2
Curiously, customer lists appear to have the least chance of
legal success on eligibility grounds despite the possible strength of
the proposed ethical claim developed above. Further, even other
business information, which tends to produce a product rather than
solely the identity and location of a customer, does not easily qualify
for trade secret protection. While the reviewed decisions are not
always clear, the following lists the nature of the ideas litigated in
"other business information" cases: cable television receptivity, 9 3
an enhancement program for business skills,9 4 financial accounting
computer software,9" a franchisor's business forms,9 6 a franchisor's
high speed data acquisition module, 97 a jobber management system, 9 8 ajournalist's investigative material,9 9 a labor estimating man-

92. 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974). See also infra text accompanying notes 162-168; infra
note 186.
93. Lehman v. Dow Jones & Co., 783 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1986).
94. McKay v. Communispond, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). See also infra
text accompanying notes 257-260.
95. Aries Information Sys., Inc. v. Pacific Management Sys. Corp., 366 N.W.2d 366
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
96. American Nursing Care of Toledo, Inc. v. Leisure, 609 F. Supp. 419 (N.D. Ohio
1984).
97. Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, Inc., 371 Mass. 643, 358 N.E.2d 804 (1976).
98. Dickerman Assocs., Inc. v. Tiverton Bottled Gas Co., 594 F. Supp. 30 (D. Mass.
1984).
99. Peckarsky v. American Broadcasting Co., 603 F. Supp. 688 (D.D.C. 1984).

1090

MARYLAND

LAW REVIEW

[VoL. 47:1076

ual, 0 0 a marketing program,' 0 ' rebate information, 0 2 a software
0 4
prompter for television and theatre, 0 3 a telephone sales script,1
0 5
and a television script.1
Only four of the above "secrets" qualified as legally eligible for
protection. 10 6 A franchisor's business forms, fort example, were
"merely common business forms for recording generic business
information indigenous" to the business in American Nursing Care of Toledo, Inc. v. Leisure."' Even a labor-estimating manual, a
comprehensive tabulation of over 57,000 entries showing the labor
hours necessary to install electrical items used in nearly every type
of construction project, was denied trade secret eligibility.' 0 8 While
the claimant developed the manual over the years from his experience and "[w]hile not everyone, or even a substantial nuner of
people, could do what he did, his method is a matter of public
'0 9
knowledge, not a secret."'
On the other hand, a computer software program concerning a
jobber management system for oil dealers that cost $400,000 and
twenty-two man months to develop qualified as a trade secret in
Dickerman Associates, Inc. v. Tiverton Bottled Gas Co. "o Other technical
systems, including one costing $100,000 designed to meet financial
accounting reporting requirements of public bodies such as school
t2
districts and county governments,"' a data acquisition module,"
and a software prompter for television"' also were eligible as possi100. Koontz v.Jaffarian, 617 F. Supp. 1108 (E.D. Va. 1985), aff'd, 787 F.2d 906 (4th
Cir. 1986).
101. Foods Plus, Inc. v. Frankel, 54 A.D.2d 706, 387 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1976).
102. Howard Schultz & Assoc. of the Southeast, Inc. v. Broniec, 239 Ga. 181, 236
S.E.2d 265 (1977).
103. Q-CO Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
104. Morton B. Katz & Assoc., Ltd. v. Arnold, 175 Ga. App. 278, 333 S.E.2d 115

(1985).
105. Whitfield v. Lear, 751 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1984).
106. See infra notes 110-113 and accompanying text.

107. 609 F. Supp. 419, 432 (N.D. Ohio 1984). See also supra note 35.
108. Koontz v. Jaffarian, 617 F. 5-.'pp. 1108 (E.D. Va. 1985), aff'd, 787 F.2d 906 (4th
Cir. 1986) (declining to find a trade secret where the method by which author developed
and compiled data was not secret).
109. Id. at 1115.
110. 594 F. Supp. 30, 35 (D. Mass. 1984).
111. Aries Information Sys., Inc. v. Pacific Management Sys. Corp., 366 N.W.2d 366,
367-68 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
112. Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, Inc., 371 Mass. 643, 648, 358 N.E.2d 804,
807 (1976).
113. Q-CO Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 618 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (software
program potentially trade secret, but no irreparable injury warranting injunction because program based on secrets apparently inoperable).
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ble trade secrets.
Note that the eligible secrets listed were used for more than the
sole purpose of finding receptive customers. The cases conceptually bridge the gap between general information which produces
some use apart from identifying possible customers and that additionally contributes in another way to the enhancement of a business. But the cases meld into customer lists in a case such as Lehman
v. Dow Jones & Co. "4 There, information as to the receptivity of
company officers to a prospective merger and the attractiveness of
an opportunity to acquire a cable television company failed to win
court approval as protectable." 15 Lehman highlights the innate problem of carving out practically distinct information. The court noted
that "[a]lthough the bulk of trade secret law relates to industrial information, some kinds of non-industrial business information-for
example, data related to customers, merchandising, cost and pricing, and systems and methods-[can be] protected.""' 6 Of relevance here is the protection sometimes given information
concerning business opportunities, like knowledge of valuable mineral discoveries, a brokerage opportunity, or an impending
transaction.
Assuming for purposes of discussion that the relevant
"business" engaged in by [the plaintiff] was the finding of
corporate acquisition deals, we find it impossible to characterize the availability and attractiveness information as "a
process or device for continuous use in the operation of
the business" as required by the Restatement definition."t 7
The court cited its conceptual difficulty with these types of
claims. It felt that the claimant here attempted to protect information as to a single or ephemeral event in the conduct of a business.
The information at issue was "not used to run plaintiff's business
but was its product: like the car that rolls off the production
line. ... ""'
But this proposed distinction concerns both the legal and ethical theorist. Unlike technical and scientific ideas that manifest a
more recognizable mass of information, general business informa114. 783 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1986) (Friendly, J.).
115. Id. at 297.
116. Id. at 298 (citing 1 R. MILGRIM, supra note 7, § 209[8]).
117. 783 F.2d at 298.
118. Id. (emphasis in original). The court expressly declined to say, however, "that a
business like [the plaintiff's] will never possess information that qualifies as a trade secret." Id. (emphasis added).
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tion and company techniques become subtly interwoven into the
personality and practices of the individuals exposed to the specific
company environment. This environment includes awareness of
certain company-generated material, such as expensively obtained
techniques for locating and doing business. General business information often depends on the availability of specific empirical data,
such as a business form, a sales script, the name of a lead, and how a
customer may be approached. But how can the law separate this
business information from the individuals who know it so that it retains its company identity?" 9 That part of the question activates
consideration of the rights of society in the traditional balancing
20
act. 1
The court in Amex Distributing Co. v. Mascari 121 articulated this
difficulty in the context of a produce brokerage business. It distinguished between business information such as a customer list and
employee rights encompassed by personal knowledge of particular
customers. 2 2 Beginning as a "bird dog," or produce inspector, the
defendant at nineteen years of age began to learn the produce business. 1 23 As the years went by, he assumed greater responsibilities in
a highly competitive economic arena, putting together transactions
for shippers and buyers.' 24 The company, and therefore the defendant, "owed its success to an in-depth knowledge of the customers' needs and predilections and an assiduous pursuit of serving
those needs by frequent contacts." 1 25 In denying the former employer relief on a number of grounds, the court addressed the trade
secret question and the balancing act courts occasionally are called.
upon to exercise:
Conflicting social and economic policy considerations are
119. At least one court has tried to reduce the question to more definite terms. Under
what is sometimes referred to as the "Hollingsworth test," a judge should perform a
five-part analysis to determine "whether in a given case the knowledge gained by an
employee is secret and confidential." Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co. v. Turley,
622 F.2d 1324, 1331 (9th Cir. 1980) (quoting California Intelligence Bureau v. Cunningham, 83 Cal. App. 2d 197, 203, 188 P.2d 303, 306 (1948)). See also Surgidev Corp.
v. Eye Technology, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 661, 681-82 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd, 828 F.2d 452
(8th Cir. 1987).
120. The distinction between certain managerial techniques or organizational structures and eligible trade secret ideas is not so easily seen in some cases. The ethicist's
problem with this exercise is revealed in R. DEGEORGE, supra note 1, at 296.
121. 150 Ariz. 510, 724 P.2d 596 (1986).
122. Id. at 516, 724 P.2d at 602.
123. Id. at 512, 724 P.2d at 598.
124. Id.
125. 150 Ariz. at 512. 724 P.2d at 598.
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present in each trade secret case. A business which may
invest substantial time, money and manpower to develop
secret advantages over its competitors, must be afforded
protection against the wrongful appropriation of confidential information by a prior employee, who was in a position
of confidence and trust. At the same time, the right of an
individual to follow and pursue the particular occupation
for which he is best trained is a most fundamental right.
Our society is extremely mobile and our free economy is
based upon competition. One who has worked in a particular field cannot be compelled to erase from his mind all of
the general skills, knowledge
and expertise acquired
26
through his experience.'
In denying the employer's claim for trade secret status to the
company's general methods and principles of doing business, the
court commented that as "another court has rather memorably put
it, absent a special and enforceable duty, an alert salesperson is not
12 7
required to undergo a prefrontal lobotomy."
Thus, business information cases did not fare well in litigation,
as both customer lists and other general business information claims
succeeded in only twenty-eight percent of the attempts reviewed.
But following the courts in their application of the principle of eligibility sometimes is difficult. The following identified customer list
cases, by subject matter, overview the eligibility factor: a button
manufacturer's list,128 dental patients, 129 carbofuran buyers, 3 ° construction supply buyers, 13 ' diagnostic kit customers, 3 2 a filter customer's characteristics, 133 a franchisor's suppliers, 1 4 a fruit
importer's characteristics, 135 an insurance policyholders list,' 36 oph126. Id. at 516, 724 P.2d at 602 (quoting ILG Indus. v. Scott, 49 Ill. 2d 88, 93-94, 273
N.E.2d 393, 396 (1971)).
127. Id. at 517, 724 P.2d at 603 (citing Fleming Sales Co. v. Bailey, 611 F. Supp. 507,
514 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (applying, in the absence of a covenant, Indiana's version of the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act)).
128. Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C&C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985). See also infra text accompanying notes 287-289.
129. Dampfv. Bloom, 127 A.D.2d 719, 512 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1987).
130. FMC Corp. v. Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984). See
also infra text accompanying notes 234-236.
131. McCann Constr. Specialties Co. v. Bosman, 44 Ill. App. 3d 1020, 358 N.E.2d
1340 (1977).
132. Microbiological Research Corp. v. Muna, 625 P.2d 690 (Utah 1981).
133. Cambridge Filter Corp. v. International Filter Co., 548 F. Supp. 1301 (D. Nev.
1982).
134. Proimos v. Fair Automotive Repair, Inc., 808 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1987).
135. Isra Fruit Ltd. v. Agrexco Agric. Export Co., 631 F. Supp. 984 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal
denied, 804 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1986).
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thalmologists using implanting techniques,' 3 7 magazine subscriptions, 13 8 marketing contacts, 1 9 a newspaper distributors list,140 an
original equipment manufacturer's purchasing behavior,' 4 ' a pipe
distributor's customer list,' 4 2 a plastic manufacturer's customer
list,' 4 3 pressure sensitive label customers, 14 4 a purse buyers list,' 4 5 a
temporary employment agency client list,' 46 a video center customer list,' 47 a vitamin mailing list,148 and voting machine
customers.

49

Only six of the cases listed were clearly eligible for protection:
those involving the dental patients,' 50 the newspaper distributors,' 5 ' the ophthalmologists, 5 2 the voting machines,'15 the video
center,' 5 4 and the carbofuran buyers. 1 55 The claimants in three
cases, those involving the temporary employment agency,' 56 the
136. Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Crouch, 606 F. Supp. 464 (S.D. Ind. 1985),
aff'd, 796 F.2d 477 (7th Cir. 1986).
137. Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Technology, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 661 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd,
828 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1987).
138. Perfect Subscription Co. v. Kavaler, 427 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
139. Walter E. Zemitzsch, Inc. v. Harrison, 712 S.W.2d 418 (Mo. App. 1986).
140. Auburn News Co. v. Providence Journal Co., 504 F. Supp. 292 (D.R.I. 1980),
rev'd on other grounds, 659 F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982).
141. Fleming Sales Co. v. Bailey, 611 F. Supp. 507 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
142. Mercer v. C.A. Roberts Co., 570 F.2d 1232 (5th Cir. 1978).
143. American Wheel & Eng'g Co. v. Dana Molded Prods., Inc., 132 Il1. App. 3d 205,
476 N.E.2d 1291 (1985).
144. American Printing Converters, Inc. v. JES Label & Tape, Inc., 103 A.D.2d 787,
477 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1984).
145. Robert B. Vance & Assocs., Inc. v. Baronet Corp., 487 F. Supp. 790 (N.D. Ga.
1979).
146. Gordon Employment, Inc. v. Jewell, 356 N.W.2d 738 (Minn. App. 1984).
147. Kozuch v. CRA-MAR Video Center, Inc., 478 N.E.2d 110 (Ind. App. 1985).
148. Darby Drug Co. v. Zlotnick, 573 F. Supp. 661 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
149. International Elections Sys. Corp. v. Shoup, 452 F. Supp. 684 (E.D. Pa. 1978),
aff'd without opinion, 595 F.2d 1212 (3d Cir. 1979).
150. Dampf v. Bloom, 127 A.D.2d 719, 512 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1987).
151. Auburn News Co. v. Providence Journal Co., 504 F. Supp. 292, 305 (D.R.I.
1980), rev'd on other grounds, 659 F.2d 273 (lst Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921
(1982).
152. Surgidev Corp. v. Eye Technology, Inc., 648 F. Supp. 661 (D. Minn. 1986), aff'd,
828 F.2d 452 (8th Cir. 1987).
153. International Elections Sys. Corp. v. Shoup, 452 F. Supp. 684, 706 (E.D. Pa.
1978), aff'd without opinion, 595 F.2d 1212 (3d Cir. 1979). But see P.J. Garvey Carting &
Storage, Inc. v. County of Erie, 125 A.D.2d 972, 972, 510 N.Y.S.2d 365, 366 (1986)
(route list for delivery of voting machines was common knowledge and not a trade
secret).
154. Kozuch v. CRA-MAR Video Center, Inc., 478 N.E.2d 110, 113 (Ind. App. 1985).
155. FMC Corp. v. Taiwan Tainan Giant Indus. Co., 730 F.2d 61, 63 (2d Cir. 1984).
156. Gordon Employment, Inc. v. Jewell, 356 N.W.2d 738, 741 (Minn. App. 1984)
(information not kept confidential).
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button manufacturer's list,' 5 7 and a plastic manufacturer's list,I15 8
apparently failed as beneficiaries for protection on other
grounds.' 5 9
Should there be a public policy protecting this variety of business information? Are some ideas more valuable to society when
freely available or when subject to competitive thrust? The moralist
or policymaker considering the societal implication of trade secret
protection might question whether all the ideas listed are of equal
worth to society. Some might argue that withholding a certain business idea with a direct and immediate benefit to society is bad public
policy. Deontologically, the rule might read that ideas and information directly promoting intellectual and technical advancement belong to the public. Others might find such a policy permissible only
under the principle of proportionality. In situations where both the
intended means and end are good in and of themselves, one may
ethically permit foreseen but unintended side effects, if and only if
one has a proportionate reason for doing so.' 6 ' Under this philosophical mantle, one may press the view that limiting free access to
new ideas or techniques is the only reasonable method of encouraging development.'
When one examines the eligibility feature this way, the good
traditionally stems from those reasons ethically supporting the enforcement of property rights. But leaving aside for the moment the
traditional rationale supporting the right to private property, let us
inquire solely into the possible loss to society by a public policy enforcing trade secret protection so liberally.

157. Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C&C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053, 1063 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985) (failure to adequately protect lists).
158. American Wheel & Eng'g Co. v. Dana Molded Prods., Inc., 132 Iln. App. 3d 205,
210, 476 N.E.2d 1291, 1295 (1985) (lack of security measures and confidential
treatment).
159. Customer lists may fail to achieve protection because of the eligibility requirement, even if the employer and employee agree they are confidential. Even an "agreement between an employer and employee that something is a trade secret is not
controlling if in fact it is not." Cambridge Filter Corp. v. International Filter Co., 548 F.
Supp. 1301, 1306 (D. Nev. 1982).
160. T. GARRETr, supra note 18, at 8-9.
161. Garrett reminds the reader that the principle of proportionality is to be judged
by the type of goodness or evil involved, the urgency of the situation, the certainty or
probability of the effects, the intensity of one's influence on the effects and the availability of alternate means. Some of these standards would test the principle quickly, such as
probability of effects and availability of alternate means. For example, in the latter instance a strong argument that patent law is a more equitable route than protection of
trade secrets could be advanced. Id. at 10-11.
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C. Benefit and Loss to Society
Do courts consider the eligibility issue from a public policy or
ethical view? Not directly, perhaps, but the Supreme Court raised
the issue of deprivation of society in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron
Corp.,162 in which the Court reversed a Sixth Circuit ruling that
Ohio's trade secret laws conflicted with the patent laws of the
United States. In finding that state trade secret law did not conflict
with patent law, the majority articulated several public policy, i.e.,
ethical, rationales for the enforcement of trade secrets.' 6 3 The
opinion noted the existence of business ideas somewhat between
patentable inventions and other valuable business information by
stating that trade secret law encourages independent innovators to
64
proceed with discovery and exploitation of their inventions.,
Competition is fostered and the public is not deprived of the use of
valuable, if not quite patentable, inventions. 6 5 Further, the Court
discussed the role of trade secret protection against the faithless employee 6 6 and noted that:
Instead, then, of licensing others to use his invention and
making the most efficient use of existing manufacturing
and marketing structures within the industry, the trade secret holder would tend either to limit his utilization of the
invention, thereby depriving the public of the maximum
benefit of its use, or engage in the time-consuming and economically wasteful enterprise of constructing duplicative
manufacturing and marketing
mechanisms for the exploita67
tion of the invention.'
The majority concluded that "[t]he detrimental misallocation of
resources and economic waste that would ... take place . . . with
respect to employees or licensees cannot be justified by reference to
1 68
any policy that the federal patent law [sought] to advance."
These rationales have a particular utilitarian sound to them
which assists the reader when looking at the recent cases. In
Kewanee Oil the technical idea was a process involving sodium iodide
synthetic crystals, but one might ask whether all trade secrets are
ethically equal. In analyzing the cases by character of the secret,
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

416 U.S. 470 (1974).
Id. at 481-82.
Id.
Id. at 485.
416 U.S. at 486.
Id. at 486-87.
Id. at 489.
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denying society the free use of a product having a direct health benefit is treated differently than restricting ideas advancing technology. This is arguably even more true when comparing healthrelated ideas to those concerning product innovation. But one cannot ignore the moralist's caveat that all possible effects be fully
69
examined. 1
Consider the consequences of depriving society of the secret at
issue in one of the product innovation cases, Peggy Lawton Kitchens,
Inc. v. Hogan.170 There, a food company brought an action to enjoin
a former employee from marketing chocolate chip cookies based on
a recipe claimed to be a trade secret. As the appeals court tells it:
"Nothing is sacred. We have before us a case of the theft of a recipe
for baking chocolate chip cookies. The question is whether the
plaintiff.., possessed a protected trade secret."' 7 1 Apparently, an
officer of the plaintiff corporation mixed the chaff from walnuts
("nut dust") in his chocolate chip cookie batter. This produced a
distinctive flavor and was an immediate commercial success. The
plaintiff's evidence included such catchy testimony as "miraculous,
sales took off immediately, it did to cookies what butter does to popcorn, and it made the flavor sing."' 72 The court concluded that
while the basic ingredients were common to any chocolate chip
cookie, the combination in which those ingredients were used, the
diameter and thickness of the cookie, and the degree to which it was
baked constituted a formula the law could protect. 173 In any event,
including nut dust into the mix added that modicum of originality
separating the process from the everyday and characterizing a trade
secret. 174
The court held the cookie recipe a protected trade secret. One
might say that the restriction from freely enjoying the nuance of flavor, a psychological good, in a certain chocolate chip cookie would
not rate highly on the "deprivation to society" list. An examiner
might render similar initial judgment to the plaintiff's claim for "liquid smoke" in Hickory Specialties, Inc. v. B&L Laboratories,Inc. 17169. See R. DEGEORGE, supra note 1, at 47.
170. 18 Mass. App. Ct. 937, 466 N.E.2d 138 (1984).
171. Id. at 937, 466 N.E.2d at 139.
172. Id. at 938, 466 N.E.2d at 139.
173. Id. at 939, 466 N.E.2d at 139-40.
174. 18 Mass. App. Ct. at 939, 466 N.E.2d at 139-40.
175. 592 S.W.2d 583 (Tenn. App. 1979). This decision concerned the claim of a manufacturer of a product known as "liquid smoke," which is applied to meat products to
impart smoke flavoring and color. Id. at 584. The manufacturer succeeded in developing a process that duplicated the taste and aroma of smoked food without the traditional
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The problem, however, with granting ethical preference to
those delivering only psychological satisfactions is the quality of
public good in permitting people to indulge in these satisfactions.
Supplying cocaine, for example, apparently satisfies a great need for
some, but the other evils flowing from its promotion and distribution are severe. In fact, trade secret law had its beginnings in the
product innovation decisions one might call the "magic elixir" cases
in England.' 7 6
Utilitarians might grant that an elixir relieving pain and enhancing the health of others is good. But they would then press that its
availability to society should be relatively free. Historically, the first
point was probably moot as many magic elixirs were, if not patently
fraudulent, of questionable value for the ailments and conditions so
outrageously advertised. 177 One may argue from hindsight that the
protection sought for an inefficacious product is not justified. This
is particularly true where successful advertising creates demand and
therefore product value. Producers can argue only that the sale of
their products brings employment and therefore good.' 7 Part of
American folklore, however, is that the old time medicine side-show
performer stimulated the demand for the item by the misrepresentations about its value made to an unsuspecting public. Note that
elixir cases, when viewed this way, lack the raison d'etre for trade secret protection, the development or promotion of value to society.
Deontologists would interpret the demand for the product as artificially created by the advertiser, using the purchasers solely as a
means to profit.
smoking process. Id. The obvious primary "good" would be the psychological one of
satisfing the acquired taste without the expense of the usual method of smoking food.
Id. While this is of some value, it might not initially qualify as a major advancement to
society.
176. Such cases involved the protection of a formula or concoction for various ailments, a home remedy "gone public," so to speak. This genre included such products
as "Wistar's Balsam of Wild Cherry," Fowle v. Park, 131 U.S. 88 (1889), and "Morison's
Universal Medicine," Morison v. Moat, 9 Hare 241, 68 Eng. Rep. 492 (1851). Given the
advertised objective to cure mankind of all maladies from baldness to cancers, the protector of the secret formula had a steep ethical hill to climb to justify such exclusive
proprietary behavior.
177. The extent to which these magic elixirs, Indian salves, kidney cures, electric medicated pads, liquid bread, and the like were a part of American history is detailed in B.
McNAMARA, STEP RiHT Up (1976).

178. The simple fact of the matter is that advertising does seem excessive in so many
instances. When advertising effort extends beyond the objectives of supplying truthful
information, showing availability of the product, and assisting in the creation of good
will for the producer, the ethical temptations are great and the moral judgments are
comparatively simple regardless of whether one uses a teleological or deontological approach. See R. DEGEORGE, supra note 1, at 275.
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The moralist cautions the examiner to unearth all possible benefits. In Hickory Specialties, Inc. v. B&L Laboratories,Inc.,' 7 9 a process
for artificially creating the taste and aroma of smoked food responded to the consumer's psychological need, but was, by itself,
neither moral nor immoral. A rush to judgment in the liquid smoke
case, however, would have overlooked that, "[d]ue to environmental
and health problems associated with the traditional smoking process, the demand for liquid smoke has increased dramatically in re80
cent years."'
In effect, the court suggested that the liquid smoke "secret"
easily might qualify as directly beneficial, perhaps even to a degree
comparable to those secrets categorized as health benefits and technological advancements. Both undisclosed benefits and harm are
possible in a trade secret, however, and one cannot always assume
that a formula or idea has the effect that the claimant purports. The
confidentiality required of a trade secret "may also conceal danger8
ous aspects of a product."' '1
Nearly every business idea of the technical-scientific kind appears legally eligible, but whether such characterization by the
courts satisfies defensible public policy does not seem to have been
reviewed.i8 2 In most of the reviewed cases the ruling on eligibility
revealed scant concern with public policy. Such an analysis perhaps
has been foreclosed by the law's familiar habits when dealing with
property rights. Before summarizing the ethical effects flowing
from eligibility, some comment is appropriate on property rights
and trade secret law.
D. Impact of the Property Connection
The right of trade secrets is founded either on the law of prop179. 592 S.W.2d 583 (Tenn. App. 1979).
180. Id. at 584.
181. See S. BOK, SECRETS: ON THE Ermcs or CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 146
(1982) (noting that under the shield of trade secrets the side effects of certain drugs
have been kept from the public, as has been the ineffectiveness of other drugs).
182. An exception is Demit of Venezuela v. Electronic Water Sys., Inc., 547 F. Supp.
850 (S.D. Fla. 1982), aff'd, 740 F.2d 977 (11th Cir. 1984), which involved the method
and particular chemicals used to condition an electro-mechanical water treatment device
to remove minerals that eventually could cause scaling in boilers and pipes. The defendant in that case pressed that the plaintiff had not adequately shown whether the
particular secret had beneficial value. In response to this contention that court stated:
"Although this Court may take issue with what the Defendant may view as beneficial, we
are not called to render such an opinion since the Plaintiffs produced persuasive testimony showing that their treatment had beneficial value." Id: at 852 (emphasis in
original).
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erty or on the obligations of fiduciary duty owed to the claimant by
the party alleged to have appropriated the secret. 83 Early American decisions framed trade secret protection in terms of protectable
property rights, 18 4 but many authorities today maintain that trade
85
secret law protects against breaches of confidential relationships.1
Certainly the trade secret claimant's legal contention that, for some
purposes, he or she has a "property" right in the secret is not without support on constitutional grounds.' 8 6 In the recent case of
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co.,187 for example, an inventor, developer,
and seller of pesticides invested substantial sums in developing active ingredients for pesticides.' 88 The company was required to
submit data on these formulas to the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), thereby exposing its secret to the world.' 8 9 The
Supreme Court noted that "[a]lthough this Court never has
squarely addressed the question whether a person can have a property interest in a trade secret, which is admittedly intangible, the
Court has found other kinds of intangible interests to be property
for the purposes of the Fifth Amendment's Taking Clause."' 9 °
The Court ruled that "to the extent that Monsanto has an interest in its health, safety and environmental data cognizable as a
trade-secret property right under Missouri law, that property right is
183. Note, supra note 7, at 80910.
184. Id. at 809. See also Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 320 (1987) (quoting 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 857.1, at 260 (rev.
ed. 1986)) ("Confidential information acquired or compiled by a corporation in the
course and conduct of its business is a species of property to which the corporation has
the exclusive right and benefit ... ").
185. Note, supra note 7, at 810-11. This dichotomy was examined recently in Remington Rand Corp.-Delaware v. Business Sys., Inc., 830 F.2d 1260 (3d Cir. 1987). There,
an American company's trade secrets were treated as assets of a bankrupt Dutch corporation, which had been licensed to use them. Id. at 1262. The Dutch trustees in bankruptcy disbursed the material containing the secrets to a third-party creditor. Id. While
Remington instituted litigation for compensation, the defendant creditor argued that
Remington's failure to file a verified claim against the bankrupt estate precluded it from
participating in the distribution of property. Id. at 1263-64. Applying Dutch civil statutory law, which recognizes both a "duty of good care to be observed in social intercourse" and obligations of confidentiality concerning trade secrets, the Third Circuit
found that the trustees had committed "an inappropriate act." Id. at 1264.
186. In Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974), the Court upheld
Ohio's protection of trade secrets as "intellectual property." Id at 479. Mr. Justice
Douglas, however, did not agree. In his dissent, he stated that a trade secret, "unlike a
patent, has no property dimension" and that a "suit to redress theft of a trade secret is
grounded in tort damages for a breach of contract-a historic remedy." Id. at 497-98.
187. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
188. Id. at 998.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1003.
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protected by the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment."'' This
property right includes the right to exclude others, which is "one of
the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly
characterized as property." 192
The public policy or ethical support for such private ownership
rests principally on the contention that the fruits of one's labor belong to the laborer. This concurs with a type of ownership that promotes the efficient creation of wealth.' 9 3 Accordingly, servo motors
and other useful products manifest an efficient addition to the public wealth. And a solid ethical claim resides in those whose efforts,
time, and capital bring this about.' 94 But is this claim absolute when
measured against the competing principle that resources were
placed on earth for the benefit of all, even if the control of them
belongs to certain individuals? 9 5 Certainly, the control aspect of
trade secret cases is very interesting. After all, servo motors and
respiratory techniques exist as ideas, not fully captured by the first
taker. Further, has society adjudicated ownership claims by a reasoned public policy? At least if one receives a registered patent, one
has nearly absolute ownership, albeit for a limited time.' 9 6 . This
trade-off is at least an attempt at a public equitable adjustment of
the interests. The court in Laurie Visual Etudes, Inc. v. ChesebroughPond's Inc. 9 7 reminded us:
[T]he patent holder is the last one in the world who
should be permitted to contend there is more to his invention or idea that was not disclosed in the patent. "We
would remind [patent applicants] that if they have in truth
invented something which promotes the progress of science and the useful arts, then in exchange for a patent
grant they must make a full and complete disclosure of
their invention, leaving nothing to speculation or

191. 467 U.S. at 1003-04.
192. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979), quoted in Ruckelshaus, 467
U.S. at 1011.
193. W. COLLINS, supra note 18, at 88.
194. "The theory of economic justice underlying American capitalism has tended to
emphasize contribution to society, along with merit and hard work, as the basis of distribution." W. HOFFMAN &J. MOORE, supra note 25, at 14.
195. "The Western notions of property law . . .presuppose a view of property expressed most forcefully by Locke: that individuals have a right to what they have made,
joined their labor to, or worked to wrest from nature .... S. BOK,supra note 181, at
143.
196. See supra notes 20 & 29.
197. 83 A.D.2d 505, 441 N.Y.S.2d 88 (1981).
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doubt."' 9 8
Evaluating the moral right to trade secrets as private property is
not easy, particularly since private ownership of the means of production distinguishes capitalism. Is it then necessarily fair that certain people have an exclusive right of ownership just because they
are the first to effectively manifest a new idea, process, thought, or
information; take possession of chattels; or even settle the land?' 99
To attempt an answer suggests employing the tools of the ethicist.
In this connection, the moralist offers several methods of judging
behavior.
Ownership of trade secrets viewed from a utilitarian perspective
promotes individual freedom to "create," rewards initiative and
risk-taking, and results in the efficient production of goods, thereby
increasing the productivity of society to the benefit of all. To expend money, time, and effort, only to have a claim denied might be
harmful because others would see no reason for such expenditure.
Negatively, however, protection of the trade secret as property can
be exploitive both in the transaction surrounding its creation and in
its use.
The deontologists might formalize the claim by stating that the
work product belongs to its creator to a reasonable extent, provided
that in creating and holding exclusive rights to the trade secret one
respects the rights of others as human beings. The deontologists
would further police this claim by inquiring how the trade secret was
taken from another. This inquiry will be addressed in the section on
conduct and relationships.
E.

The Bottom Line

Legally, trade secret eligibility is likely to be acknowledged in
technical-scientific cases, but only occasionally acknowledged in
other business information cases. To sum up these arguments, a
utilitarian might balance the good effects flowing from legal protection of trade secrets against the bad. The following chart outlines
the good and bad effects:

198. Id. at 506, 441 N.Y.S.2d at 90 (Silverman, J., dissenting) (quoting In re Lorenz,
305 F.2d 875, 878 (C.C.P.A. 1962)).
199. W. COLLINS, supra note 18, at 95.
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GOOD EFFECTS

BAD EFFECTS

The public is:
*the limited direct
beneficiary of additional
information
*encouraged to seek new
information for reward of
exclusivity
*benefited by potential
further improvements by
claimants.

The public is:
*barred from free use of
the information by directly
using it
*prevented from building on
this information for
further advancement
*unable to protect itself
from any adverse effects
*subject to the claimant's
misuse of his or her
advantageous position by
-thwarting competition
-over-charging
-keeping information as to the
secret's ill effects on society.

The claimant is:
*the beneficiary of property
rights
*able to keep information to
himself or herself
*able to build a successful
business
*rewarded financially
*able to provide employment
to others
*encouraged to search for
further improvements on his or
her trade secret.

The claimant is:
*expending money, time and
effort for no reward
*not motivated to further
develop where an advantage
is lacking.

Ethically evaluating the examined cases of the past eleven years
demonstrates these points. Even technical and scientific ideas that
result in a product or service that benefits health or the environment
or merely advances technology are justified as eligible ethically for
trade secret status, provided there is a net gain to society. The bad
effects of granting trade secret status are substantial, however, and
paradoxically include the tendency to retard the advancement of science. The property argument acknowledges these pros and cons
and assists the claimant in this country, but whether it fully satisfies
ethical demands is doubtful. Included in this doubt is human nature
regarding monopolies, the "water runs to the sea" complaint.
Arguably, technical and scientific ideas are likely candidates to
be shared with others because their claim to exclusivity is marginal
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except for the great cost and effort some claimants expend developing them. Interestingly, courts do not make investing large amounts
of money and effort a necessity for trade secret eligibility. The fairness of an appropriation is not decided on the issue of eligibility,
but on the conduct of the parties in regard to the securing and
taking.
In a sense, the technical-scientific ideas here labeled product
innovation have a stronger ethical claim to eligibility based on the
deprivation to society argument. The chocolate chip cookies, electronic games, and toy robots of the world, which bring a certain but
ethically questionable richness to life, hardly embody ideas that society demands to know freely. So, too, with customer lists. These
lists develop business and do not directly diminish society. Further,
the property argument appeals nicely here for such lists are created
after some expenditures of time, money, and effort.
Reconciling legal theory with ethical theory is not possible using this approach. Customer list cases do not have the best eligibility record, but some agreement exists in the general business
information cases. The law does not favor protecting business information, and the ethicist has a similar view. Perhaps the fuzziness
of the ideas seeking protection gives both examiners a problem.
Notice that only in the elaborate computer program cases, which
packaged or logically structured ideas, did the law find an identifiable, and therefore protectable, mass with which to work. Further,
the ethicist also has trouble with a legal rule that denies the portability of personal skills developed through employment with the claimant's company.
IV.

CONDUCT OF THE PARTIES

A.

Introduction

If our ethical analysis of trade secrets as protectable rights has
produced a mixed judgment in which some types of ideas have a
reasonable claim to protection and others only a weak one, the inquiry into how parties struggle over claims to secrets should bear
clear ethical markings. After all, evaluating human conduct is the
business of ethics, and trade secret cases supposedly promote commercial morality. Unfortunately, this expectation is not cleanly
realized.
Courts frequently engage the fairness issue when reviewing the
specific conduct of the parties in trade secret cases. But they do so
without a unified approach to the underlying fairness of the situation. Instead, the judicial tendency is to employ legal characteriza-
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tions that short-circuit the necessary inquiry into the facts of the
matter.
Courts often resolve trade secret cases on the basis of conduct,
searching for a confidential relationship, security measures by the
claimant, and evidence that independent discovery or reverse engineering are not involved. Of course, the general ethical standard of
"improper conduct" might be, but rarely is, employed. EI. DuPont
deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, in which aerial spying on a competitor's trade secret was held to be "improper" conduct, 0 0 is one of
the few cases probing the dimensions of this standard. 2 '
The specific legal elements used by the courts do not exactly
pursue the fairness issues under examination here. Confidentiality
and the notion of security have formalistic connotations that tempt
lawyers and judges to beg certain ethical questions. These two principles, as well as the role of independent discovery and reverse engineering, merit close analysis.
B.

Elements Testing Conduct

1. Confidentiality.-A review of trade secret decisions shows
that the courts devote little argument to whether an express or implied agreement creates a confidential relationship. The confidential relationship, however, dominates much of the judicial
discussion. It is appropriate, therefore, to see whether confidentiality loses something when directed toward trade secret law rather
than to its more traditional applications.
At law, a confidential relationship is tantamount to a fiduciary
relationship that emerges when parties in certain transactions do
not deal on an equal footing.2 ° 2 In practice, the relationship often is
characterized as one party having an "overmastering influence" or
the other party having "weakness, dependence or trust.120 3 Once
200. 431 F.2d 1012, 1016 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024, rehg denied, 401
U.S. 967 (1971). For additional discussion of the case, see supra text accompanying
notes 3 & 4.
201. Id. at 1014-17.
202. BtAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 270 (5th ed. 1979); 15A C.J.S. Confidential, at 351, 355
(1967) and cases cited therein. CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM presents a broad definition of
confidentiality, including ample support for the proposition that the legal application of
the confidentiality doctrine is akin to imposing fiduciary responsibility. Id. Although
not all courts agree, references to other interpretations of confidentiality create an impression of circular reasoning. In any event, imposing the obligations inherent in the
confidentiality doctrine to trade secret cases has been an indelicate maneuver by the
courts.
203. BLACK'S LAw

DICTIONARY

270 (5th ed. 1979). See also 15A C.J.S. Confidential, at

351, 355-56 (1967) and cases cited therein. These black letter law citations, basic
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the relationship exists, the court places a legal obligation on the
dominant party to deal with the other in utmost good faith.2 ° This
relationship, foreign to the "arm's length transaction," is ajudicially
created burden intended to police over-reaching not otherwise remediable by fiaud or duress actions. 0 5 Undue influence cases are
prominent beneficiaries of the confidentiality doctrine. 0 6 These
cases deal with domineering salespersons, 20 7 aggressive sons who
rule their mothers,20 8 and daughters who dictate to their fathers. 2 °9
Yet, in each case, a factual determination of the actual relationship is
necessary. Courts closely scrutinize contracts entered into by parties in a confidential relationship and find them voidable unless affirmatively shown to be fair and voluntary in nature. 0 In effect,
21
this is not inconsistent with the ethical definition of a contract. '
though they may be, offer a much clearer summation than cases that deal with the
problem.
204. 15A C.J.S. Confidential, at 351, 352 (1967) and cases cited therein. As to joint
venturers, Judge Cardozo described the obligation as "[niot honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive." Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 463, 164
N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (Cardozo,J., concurring).
205. 15A C.J.S. Confidential (1967) and cases cited therein.
206. See Note, Use of Non-Confidential Relationship Undue Influence in Contract Recision, 49
NOTRE DAME LAW. 631, 632-33 (1974).
207. Vokes v. Arthur Murray, Inc., 212 So. 2d 906 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
208. Tretheway v. Tretheway, 16 Cal. 2d 133, 104 P.2d 1033 (Cal. 1940).
209. Confidential relationships are not patently self-revealing. A nasty person, for
example, could be the underdog needing protection. This point interestingly was made
in Hoffman v. Rickell, 191 Md. 591, 62 A.2d 597 (1948), in which the court carefully
reviewed, but upheld, a conveyance between a parent and child. "King Lear was a querulous old man but has not, on that account, been regarded as fair game for his daughters." Id. at 602, 62 A.2d at 601 (Markell, J., concurring).
210. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 173 comment b (1979) ("In addition
to assuring itself that the parties were placed on an equal footing, a court will inquire
into the fairness of the resulting agreement .... The contract is voidable unless it is
shown to be on fair terms in the light of the circumstances at the time of its making.").
Section 173 provides:
If a fiduciary makes a contract with his beneficiary relating to matters within the
scope of the fiduciary relation, the contract is voidable by the beneficiary, unless
(a) it is on fair terms, and
(b) all parties beneficially interested assent with full understanding of
their legal rights and of all relevant facts that the fiduciary knows or should
know.
Id. § 173.
211. "A contract is an agreement between two or more persons by which a right is
transferred and an obligation is created in one or more parties .... Ethics usually restricts itself to considering some features of the natural law ...... W. CoLLINs, supra note
18, at 100-01. These include factors that would create suspicion as to the genuineness
of the agreement, such as "substantial error," misrepresentation resulting in substantial
error, and fear resulting in an unfair transaction. Id.
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In trade secret doctrine, however, the courts have adopted a
different vision of a confidential relationship.2 1 2 Only the alleged
misappropriator apparently qualifies as the dominant party in most
decisions. The obligations of the confidential relationship seem to
flow in only one direction, from the owner to the receiver of the
information. Courts express scant concern about the fairness of the
bargain and direct little attention to the potential for over-reaching
and the possibility of undue influence on the part of the employer.
Trade secret decisions, then, rarely consider the "balance of
power" in the employment relationship that the traditional confidentiality doctrine contemplates.21 3 Indeed, deciding when and
how a confidential relationship is conceived gives the courts little
trouble. Courts examine an employment agreement only to ascertain whether an offer and acceptance took place. If a "confidentiality or non-disclosure" clause is present, courts almost automatically
stamp the situation with a label of "fiduciary relationship." 214 In
effect, as when defining pornography, judges appear to have few
reservations about their ability to swiftly recognize a confidential re-

'
lationship "when they see it. "215

If the courts are serious when they talk about commercial morality in trade secret decisions, the agreement creating "confidentiality" is appropriate for review, requiring concern over the quality
of the consent and the balancing between employer demands and
employee independence. The circumstances surrounding the creation of the employment relationship, the reliance on any implied obligations, and the effect of security are all factors in the fairness
matrix. Although confidentiality is decisive in judicial balancing, it
may be disguising the core issue, which is fair notice to another that
serious rights are being claimed.
212. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment j (1939) (addressing the obligations
of a confidential relationship, in which the examples of principal and agent, partners,
and joint venturers are used).
213. As one leading commentator noted, "When protection of trade secrets is afforded by operation of law, the favorite judicial rubric upon which the decisional coat is
hung is the existence of a confidential relationship." 1 R. MILORIM, supra note 7, § 4.03,
at 4-16.1. See, e.g., Burten v. Milton Bradley Co., 592 F. Supp. 1021, 1030-36 (D.R.I.
1984), rev'd, 763 F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1985).
214. See 1 R. MILGRIM, supra note 7, § 4.03, at 4-24 ("[T]he courts can refer to the
employer-employee relationship almost uniformly as being one of confidence .. ").
Milgrim goes on to posit that employers do not fare well in obtaining injunctive relief
upon this basis; this is especially true in the customer list cases. Id. The authors disagree with this finding and suggest that customer list cases represent an eligibility problem for the courts.
215. Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Proposing that legal notice does not amount to fair notice goes
too far, but that very possibility arises in trade secret cases. Legally,
notice may be defined as "knowledge brought home to a party in a
prescribed form."'2 16 Notice, both legal and "fair," is fundamental
to a fair bargain.2 1 7 Trade secret cases provide an interesting battleground over whether legal notice fulfills the expectations of equitable notice, which requires clear and particular announcement of the
existence and the dimensions of an alleged trade secret, usually
prior to exposing the claimed secret. 2 " The ethical notions of
promised secrets and secrets of trust are appropriate to our study.
A new employee who enters into a confidentiality agreement likely
would be charged with a secret of trust, for the promise of secrecy
precedes the confidence. 2 19 The pledge of secrecy obtained at an
exit interview, however, is in the nature of a promised secret, which
arises after the promisor already has learned the information. 2 20
2 21
Ethically, the secret of trust binds the promisor more stringently.
Interestingly, this point found tentative legal approval in RTE
Corp. v. Coatings, Inc.,222 involving a supplier who became privy to
the claimant's secret for improving the qualities of an inertia welded
connector. The claimant attempted to argue confidentiality based
on an "agreement" established through the passage of business
216. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1041 (4th ed. 1951).
217. The law approves a "legal" notice as sufficient in many situations. Constructive
notice, for example, is legally permissible and serves practical and ethical ends. The
degree of fairness is lowered, however, in other situations. A "constructive" notice of a
trade secret by security procedures or other inferential behavior seems a fragile way to
reach the mind, and acceptance, of the other party. The Uniform Commercial Code
proposes what appears to be an ethical form of notice consistent with the fair contract
the Code drafters sought to encourage:
A person has "notice" of a fact when (a) he has actual knowledge of it; or
(b) he has received a notice or notification of it; or (c) from all the facts and
circumstances known to him at the time in question he has reason to know that
it exists. A person "knows" or has "knowledge" of a fact when he has actual
knowledge of it....
U.C.C. § 1-201(25) (1976).
218. The RESTATEMENT OF TORTS treats the situation in which a secret is learned from
a third person without notice as a secret, and states that the third person breaches a duty
to another by disclosing it. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 758 (1939). In that case, one
"is not liable to the other for a disclosure or use of the secret prior to receipt of such
notice." Id. None of the reviewed cases referred to this provision, raising the possibility
that courts do not seriously consider disclosure under these circumstances to be an
issue.
219. W. COLLINS, supra note 18, at 87.
220. Id. at 86.
221. Id. at 87.
222. 84 Wis. 2d 105, 267 N.W.2d 226 (1978).
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forms, 223 always a tricky maneuver. The agreement, if indeed
reached legally, was in any event achieved after the disclosure of the
secret-an ethicist's promised secret. 2 24 The claimant lost the case,
the court ruling that disclosure alone does not impose a confidential
relationship. 2 5 If disclosure alone to an outside party is neither equitable nor legal notice, what in addition to disclosure is sufficient to
justify confidentiality?
An equitable notice should be timely; that is, given before disclosing the secret and under such circumstances that the party notified has fair options. 2 26 And there is the rub. Notifying an outside
party, someone dealing at arm's length as in RTE Corp., is quite a
different situation from where an employee is brought on board.
The cases examined reflect an analysis that is a mix of ideas regarding employees, security, and agreements with no sure course toward
understanding. Two basic judicial routes to resolving the dispute,
however, dominate the cases. Some parties point to a written agreement; others point to security measures adopted to protect the secret, from which an implied secrecy agreement should be imputed.
Consider the situation in which an individual, usually an employee or a contractor, contributes to or has access to a company's
trade secrets. The employer obtains an agreement to surrender any
interest in the secret as well as a promise not to reveal it. This individual subsequently decides to go elsewhere to seek his or her fortune working for a competitor or in business for himself or herself.
The claimant of the secret sues to restrain disclosure or use of the
secret information based on the original agreement and the ensuing
'confidential relationship."
As noted, the agreement argument is persuasive and legally effective. In Eastern Marble Products Corp. v. Roman Marble Inc. ,227 for
example, the secret concerned a process for making two-tone cultured marble sinks. The employee signed a nondisclosure agree223. Id. at 117, 267 N.W.2d at 232.
224. Id. at 119, 267 N.W.2d at 233.
225. Id. at 117, 267 N.W.2d at 232.
226. In this regard, the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS provides:

If A discloses the secret to B despite B's protest that he does not wish to hold it
in confidence and not so hold it if it is disclosed ...

liability

.. does not arise.

Likewise, the confidence does not arise if B has no notice of the confidential
character of the disclosure. But no particular form of notice is required. The
question is simply whether in the circumstances B knows or should know that
the information is A's trade secret and that its disclosure is made in confidence.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment j (1939). Courts seem unable to unravel this
aspect of confidentiality from traditional application of its principles.
227. 372 Mass. 835, 364 N.E.2d 799 (1977).
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ment as a condition of employment in the processing plant of the
business. 2 2 8 When he later joined a competing business, the court
indicated that the agreement effectively may have barred the employee from revealing the secret, even though he had signed while a
minor. 2 29 So, too, with the agreement in American Can Co. v. Alansukhani.23 0 There, an employee chemist and ink specialist helped to
develop jet inks used to print upon certain surfaces without contact. 2 3 ' The employee' signed a confidentiality agreement at the
commencement of his employment that the court held binding
when he started his own jet ink business.2 3 2 The employee substantially contributed to the creation of the secret, 23 3 a factor that some
judges, unlike moralists, do not honor.
When courts widen their scrutiny of fairness, they express concern for the subsequent ability of an individual to earn a living based
upon skills developed while under the obligations of the agreement.
While this is not a sophisticated inquiry, it at least represents an
attempt to examine the equitable nature of an agreement. For example, although the ex-employee in FMC Corp. v. Taiwan Tainan Giant IndustrialCo. 234 had been terminated two years earlier, the court
enjoined him and his new employer, a competitor in the insecticide
business, from using information relating to the manufacture and
the marketing of the claimant's product.2 3 5 The court set an expedited trial schedule in order to minimize the adverse effects of the
23 6
action upon the claimant's ability to earn a living.
The disappointing thing, however, is that in nearly every case
examined, reliance upon an express and timely agreement resulted
in a decision for the claimant.2 37 The courts signal that a signed
228. Id. at 840, 364 N.E.2d at 802.

229. Id. at 841, 364 N.E.2d at 803. The court, however, did not find it necessary to
decide this issue. Instead, it based its decision on the employee's common-law duty not
to disclose the information. Id.
230. 216 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 1094 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd, 728 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1982) (permanent injunction prohibiting defendants from selling jet inks developed while employed by plaintiff). The permanent injunction subsequently was clarified to cover "any
of those commercial jet ink formulas developed for specific customers" while the defendant was employed by the plaintiff. American Can Co. v. Mansukhani, 742 F.2d 314,
318 (7th Cir. 1984) (reversing a preliminary injunction issued by the district court in
subsequent proceedings).
231. 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1096.
232. Id. at 1098.
233. Id. at 1097.
234. 730 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1984).
235. Id. at 63.
236. Id. at 64.
237. An exception is Electro-Craft Corp. v. Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d 890,
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agreement is legal notice of a claimed trade secret that will be subsequently protected; they engage in little analysis of whether the bargain was "fair."
"Fair bargains" exist when there is a genuine understanding of
the transactions as well as an underlying reasonableness. 23 8 The
parties must stand on relatively equal footing; each must refrain
from using fraud, power, passion, or ignorance to bring about an
agreement that otherwise would be rejected. 239 To examine the exact language of a trade secrecy agreement is not helpful, and few
courts do. 2 4 0 A sameness to them suggests the "adhesion contract,"
which gives warning but permits no negotiation over terms or their
consequences. 24' Adhesion contracts have a better legal reputation
than an ethical analysis would accord them.2 4 2 Therefore, courts
can hardly be blamed for not monitoring commercial behavior as
they routinely honor adhesion clauses in employment contracts.2 4 3
The real issue is whether an express agreement governing an unpredictable future relationship should be binding on every signer without more. Unfortunately, the case opinions do not raise this issue in
any helpful way, but some results shock the reader into recognizing
its importance.

903 (Minn. 1983) (the court found a broad secrecy agreement ineffective in the face of
lax security measures to protect the secret).
238. A contract is truly fair when both sides are free and conscious of the implications of their acts. Freedom does not imply that the contracting parties are
overjoyed, but that their agreement is reasonable. The agreement is not reasonable, and there is no true freedom if one or both sides have used fraud,
power, passion, or ignorance to bring about an agreement which would have
been otherwise rejected.
T. GARRE-rr, supra note 18, at 55.
239. Id.
240. For a generous supply of contractual form and analysis, see Robison, supra note
5, at 385-88.
241. For a more philosophical discussion of adhesion contracts and the fair bargaining process, see Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
242. As early as 1943, Kessler offered a powerful plea for judicial review of contracts
of adhesion, which has not been heeded. Perhaps trade secret cases provide the appropriate vehicle for beginning that long overdue process. In order to do so, however,
"courts [must] become fully aware of their emotional attitude with regard to freedom of
contract.... They prefer to convince themselves and the community that legal certainty
and 'sound principles' of contract law should not be sacrificed to dictates of justice or
social desirability. Such discussions are hardly profitable." Id. at 637.
243. Judicial discomfort over the reviewed "bargain of the parties" was indicated in
Electro-CraftCorp., 332 N.W.2d 890, and Milton Bradley, 763 F.2d 461. The trial and appellate courts' opinions in Ailton Bradley provided particular insight into this problem.
See infra notes 244-251 and accompanying text.
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Burten v. Milton Bradley Co. 244 highlights the dilemma that can
arise when contract principles govern the tenets underlying the fair
bargain. There, two inventors developed the scheme and mechanism for an electronic board game, which they submitted to a game
company for consideration. As a routine part of demonstrating
their idea, the inventors signed an agreement waiving any claim to
"any relationship" with the company.2 4 5 The company subsequently marketed a game substantially similar to theirs. The court
found that the evidence established "the existence of an industrywide custom . . . to maintain the secrecy of ideas submitted by
outside inventors and to use the innovations only if royalties were
paid. . . . [Further,] not only did [Milton Bradley] adhere to this
custom [but it also] fostered such an understanding with outside inventors. '2 46 While the court painted a vivid characterization of the
"imbalance of power" inherent in this situation,2 4 7 it found the inventors had no right to recovery. 2 48 The express agreement governed. Not surprisingly, this decision was reversed on appeal and
the jury verdict reinstated. 24 9 The basis for reversal, however, was a
formalistic legal deficiency in the wording of the agreement. 2 50 The
appellate court gave no attention at all to the fairness of the bargain
or the demands of commercial morality.2 5 '
244. 592 F. Supp. 1021 (D.R.I. 1984), rev'd, 763 F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1985).
245. 592 F. Supp. at 1026.
246. Id. at 1027.
247. [The plaintiff inventors] seem at first blush to have been wronged: the
defendant used the plaintiffs' idea, profited handsomely, and eschewed compensation. And the defendant, a large and relatively unsympathetic corporation, simultaneously preyed upon and benefited from, on the one hand, a tacit
understanding that it would hold plaintiffs' submission secret, and would afford
due compensation for its use; and on the second hand, from the insulation provided by its disclosure record form. The essence of that amalgam from the
plaintiffs' viewpoint is that [Milton Bradley] offers an ersatz carrot while clutching behind its corporate back an authentic stick: it leads inventors to believe
that it will keep their suggestions private and use only ideas for which it pays,
but requires the inventors to waive virtually all rights of action against [Milton
Bradley], leaving them defenseless should [Milton Bradley] decide to swing the
club.
But, the equities are not so one-sided...

.

If manufacturers such as

[Milton Bradley] could not safeguard themselves against such forays, they
might well have to curtail submissions from independent inventors. ...
Id. at 1031.
248. Id at 1037.
249. Burten v. Milton Bradley Co., 763 F.2d 461 (1st Cir. 1985).
250. The court found the agreement ambiguous. Id. at 466.
251. In this regard, the district court articulated the problem as follows:
There remains, withal, a persistent hint of inequity. [Milton Bradley's]
methodology may well be seen as an insidious form of gameplay, constructed
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If the contract is the key to trade secret protection, consider the
situation today in the high technology industry. Companies on the
leading edge of electronic research commonly employ consultants.
Consultants are "hired guns," and their loyalty is temporal. The
company demands a confidentiality nondisclosure agreement. The
successful consultants refuse on the pardonable grounds that they
would be out of business if they agreed to such a broad undertaking.
On the other hand, the company's employees wonder why they must
surrender their complete rights in matters they are working on for
the company. But many sign when first employed, thereby creating
the automatic "confidential" relationship.
It is important to note an analytic knot in ,this strand of our
"agreement" analysis. While courts are indifferent to notice in the
sense of ensuring a fair bargain before the revelation of proprietary
information, they are most serious about the nature of the trade secret itself.25 2 Courts police the employment/secrecy bargain for
fairness by scrutinizing security measures, albeit in a somewhat circular fashion. Courts can be peculiarly sensitive to "what" is being
revealed. And here analytical confusion reigns as courts enlist the
aid of confidentiality in reviewing the security factor, which appears
to assume a notice function.
Electro-Craft Corp. v. ControlledMotion, Inc.25 3 highlights this judicial exercise. In Electro-Craft, the express agreement of confidentiality was ineffective because the nature of the secret, servo motors,
was not highlighted to the appropriator-employee.2 5 4 One could rationalize this result on the lack of equitable notice, except for the
naivet6 one would have to impute to the taker, a sophisticated engineer. The kind examiner more likely would support the result on
the total fairness of adhesion contracts generally, rather than a specific lack of notice of the propriety claim.

to trap the unwary; but it is equally consistent with the belt and suspenders
approach of a commercial enterprise determined to protect its flanks in all
events. The choice between these conflicting interpretations of the defendant's
motives is not, however, a legally significant one. Short of fraud or specific
statutory prohibitions, the marketplace is the best, indeed the only, arbiter of
such practices.
592 F. Supp. at 1037.
252. See, e.g., Rototron Corp. v. Lake Shore Burial Vault Co., 553 F. Supp. 691, 699
(E.D. Wis. 1982), aff'd, 712 F.2d 1214 (7th Cir. 1983) (finding a confidential relationship
to exist, but ruling that the alleged secret failed to pass the threshold question of
whether there was an eligible secret).
253. 332 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1983).
254. Id. at 903.
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2. Security.-Despite the fact that commercial firms frequently
enter into agreements reserving "proprietary information," in many
instances there is no such agreement, thereby relegating the claimant to attempt protection of his or her claim by unilateral behavior.
The primary method suggested by trade secret law is to practice security. Whether security is a route to confidentiality or whether its
presence simply and directly creates the right to protection is not
clear. From a fairness point of view, we characterize security as a
form of equitable notice of both the claimant's proprietary posture
and the nature and dimensions of the secret. Security in some firms
is a very expensive matter. It may not always be money and effort
well spent, but from a legal point of view its absence is fatal to the
claim. 2 5 5 The money and effort is not well spent when one understands that most trade secrets can be exposed by only moderate effort. Security is necessary, however, because the law says it is.
What purpose does security serve? Ideally, security suggests
two things: the material to be kept secret must have a clear identity;
it also must be available only on a "need to know" basis. 2 56 A warning that all manufacturing processes are proprietary, though practiced by many firms, by itself does not create a confidential
relationship nor settle the security issue. In fact, that is not security,
but is instead a prudent business practice. For example, in some
firms a manufacturing unit is isolated from other parts of the plant,
with doors locked and blinking red lights throughout warning that
the area is restricted to authorized personnel only. This arrangement is legally effective, but only to the extent that it identifies just
what part of the process is indeed a trade secret. Such also would be
considered fair notice.
Of course, one cannot boldly announce warnings about security
and then allow the material to be available to a broader audience.
For example, in McKay v. Communispond, Inc.,257 an employer's program for teaching business executives to enhance their presentation
skills was the subject of a claimed trade secret. The company's gen25 8
eral counsel lectured employees on the secrecy of the material.
255. The security analysis seems to flow from the RESTATEMENT'S emphasis on secrecy: "A substantial element of secrecy must exist, so that, except by use of improper
means, there would be difficulty in acquiring the information." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 757 comment b (1939).
256. See, e.g., Valco Cincinnati, Inc. v. N&D Machining Serv., Inc., 24 Ohio St. 3d 41,
47, 492 N.E.2d 814, 819 (1986); see generally Hickory Specialties, Inc. v. B&L Laboratories, Inc., 592 S.W.2d 583 (Tenn. App. 1979).
257. 581 F. Supp. 801 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
258. Id. at 803.
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The claimant, however, already had published much of the case program.2 59 Obviously, disclosure cannot be repaired by contrary se2 60
curity measures.
The case decisions instruct that excellent security carries the
claimant to victory. Whether this is true because security gives notice of the proprietary claim, identifies the nature and character of
the secret, or just satisfies the legal ritual demanded by trade secret
law is uncertain. The intention here is not to judge the legal reason,
but to speculate on the ethical values of the legal requirement. Extensive security sends two messages to the outsider: the claimant
not only makes a firm statement of the proprietary claim, but also
identifies the nature and character of the particular secret. Through
this unilateral statement, the declarant stakes his or her equitable
claim and warns others to continue in the relationship only under
burden of this claim.
This is not to say that security is exclusively a legal notice issue,
particularly where there is an outright intent to take another's property. In Valco Cincinnati, Inc. V. N&D Machining Service, Inc.,261 for
example, a long-time employee of the company set up a business
and contracted to supply certain parts to the employer. To that end,
the company gave plans and specifications to the former employee,
who subsequently marketed an identical product at a lower price.2 6 2
The former employee primarily grounded his defense on the fact
that he had refused to sign a nondisclosure agreement and that the
company had not taken reasonable measures to ensure the secrecy
of its process. 2 63 As to the latter point, the Supreme Court of Ohio
catalogued the claimant's "reasonable and active" steps to secure
trade secrets, which included: locking devices, a receptionist to
screen visitors, a buzzer lock system on the door to the processing
area, prohibiting the general public and competitors access to the
plant, limiting the availability of drawings to only those suppliers
and employees with actual need, marking documents with proprietary stamps, and routinely shredding outdated documents. 2 4 The
court found these efforts sufficient and, pointing to the defendant's
bad intent, affirmed the entry of a permanent injunction.2 6 5
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.

Id. at 807.
Id. at 808.
24 Ohio St. 3d 41, 492 N.E.2d 814 (1986).
Id. at 43, 492 N.E.2d at 814.
Id. at 47, 492 N.E.2d at 819.
Id.
24 Ohio St. 3d at 49, 492 N.E.2d at 820.
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On the whole, however, trade secrets claimants have not been
particularly successful when their security practices are questioned.
Perhaps companies in the litigated cases employed only marginal
security measures, but the laxness practiced or ignorance entertained by the companies is somewhat surprising. Though many
courts mention security, only seven cases were decided on security
issues.
What manifests sufficient security? In Hickory Specialties, Inc. v.
B&L Laboratories,Inc. ,266 the liquid smoke case, the company did not
instruct the employees as to secrecy, but the court held that a fence
and gate locked at night together with signs indicating restricted admittance were sufficient security, particularly where only those with
a need to know were privy to the entire process.2 6 7 The security for
the chocolate chip cookie recipe also was adequate where the company kept the recipe in the company safe, broke the formula down
into baking ingredients, and kept the gross weights of bulk ingredients on separate cards. 26 8 The charged appropriator was the safety
officer who was not entrusted with the ingredient cards.2 6 9
In cases such as the brick panel decision, however, the security
doctrine hangs uneasily. The facts of In re Innovative Construction Systems, Inc. 2 70 reveal a manufacturing business with no formal agreement regarding secrecy or nondisclosure, no security personnel
employed, a plant unlocked during business hours, suppliers and
others not denied entry into the manufacturing areas, and no exit
interviews of departing employees. The company kept the formula
for simulated brick paneling in a notebook in the plant manager's
office out of view, but also posted part of it in the relevant manufacturing area. 27 ' Wisconsin law requires that claimed trade secrets be
disclosed to the employee in confidence and be kept genuinely secret from others in the industry.2 72 The evidence revealed that the
plant layout was security conscious,2 73 but that nearly the entire
274
workforce was involved in some way in the production process.
The Seventh Circuit, in reversing the lower court and affirming the
266. 592 S.W.2d 583 (Tenn. App. 1979).
267. Id. at 587.
268. Peggy Lawton Kitchens, Inc. v. Hogan, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 937, 939, 466 N.E.2d
138, 140 (1984).
269. Id.
270. 793 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1986).
271. Id. at 884-85.
272. Id. at 883.
273. Id. at 885.
274. 793 F.2d at 883.
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jury verdict for the claimant, deemed the modest security measures
sufficient to support a verdict in the claimant's favor. 2 75 The court
noted that the jury must assess "the size and nature of [the] business, the cost to it of additional measures, and the degree to which
such measures would decrease the risk of disclosure. What may be
reasonable measures in one context may not necessarily be so in
another. '2 76 While one can find fault with the standards employed,
as to fairness the court seemed to say the company notified the employees of the secret and its character and to that extent appropriation was improper.
The courts in thirteen cases ruled that security was ineffective;
in seven of them, security was determinative of the claimant's
cause. 2 7 7 Those seven cases provide an interesting insight into security as equitable notice of the claim.
In Electro-CraftCorp. v. ControlledMotion, Inc..278 for example, the
Minnesota Supreme Court reversed the trial court's finding of a misappropriation on the grounds that the employer had not maintained
reasonable security measures. 2 79 Unimpressed by the general secrecy agreement signed at the commencement of employment and
exit interviews in which the company pointed out secret information, the court was equally unconvinced of the adequacy of security.
Guarded entrances and signs restricting access to certain plant areas
were not enough; the court frowned upon the failure to mark documents as confidential and the ease with which employees and visitors could move through the premises.2 8 ° While recognizing that
industrial espionage did not permeate this industry, the court questioned the adequacy of the means used to "signal ... that certain
information... should not be disclosed." 281' No doubt the employees were well aware of the secret nature of the information. The
court's analysis, fraught with concern for legalisms, imposes obliga275. Id. at 886.
276. Id. at 884.
277. The six cases in which security was ineffective, but not alone determinative of the
claim, are Interox v. PPG Indus., 736 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1984); Sheets v. Yamaha Motors
Corp., 657 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. La. 1987); Isra Fruit Ltd. v. Agrexco Agric. Export Co.,
631 F. Supp. 984 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal denied, 804 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1986); Lemelson v. Carolina Enters., Inc., 541 F. Supp. 645 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Permagrain Prods., Inc. v. U.S. Mat
& Rubber Co., 489 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1980); RTE Corp. v. Coatings, Inc., 84 Wis.
2d 105, 267 N.W.2d 226 (1978).
278. 332 N.W.2d 890 (Minn. 1983).
279. Id. at 901.
280. Id. at 901-03.
281. Id. at 902 (footnote omitted).
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tions that exceed the demands of fair notice of an employer's claim
to trade secrets.
As in Electro-Craft, a company manifested an intent to maintain
the secrecy of a process for manufacturing fuel nozzle seals for jet
engines inJunkunc v. S.J. Advanced Technology & Manufacturing Corp.282
The company kept files concerning the process in a locked cabinet
in an office subject to restricted access and each employee worked
on one manufacturing step without knowing anything about the
other steps.28 3 Only five people, the family members of the business, knew the entire complex process.2 8 4 Nevertheless, citing conflicting evidence concerning segregation of the process in the plant
and the failure to mark certain documents as confidential, the court
held that the trial court did not err in finding security inadequate to
afford protection of the secret.2 8 5 The fatal error here flowed from
the failure of family members to reach a specific secrecy agreement
among themselves, leaving them no remedy against a renegade
from their ranks who opened a competing concern.2 8 6
Finally, consider the result in Defiance Button Machine Co. v. C&C
Metal Products Corp. ,287 in which a company inadvertently left confidential data in the memory of a computer sold to a competitor.
Although the company had taken security efforts such as keeping
relevant computer discs in a locked room, the competitor might
have been able to access the customer lists using source books in its
possession.28 8 Certainly the competitor knew that the information
was considered secret. Nevertheless, the competitor hired a former
employee to extract the information, which the court felt was permissible given the inadequacy of efforts to keep the secret.2 8 9
These cases raise the obvious question: Would a lay observer
282. 149 Ill.
App. 3d 114, 498 N.E.2d 1179 (1986), appeal denied, 113 Ill.
2d 575, 505

N.E.2d 353 (1987).
283. Id. at 119, 498 N.E.2d at 1183.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 119-20, 498 N.E.2d at 1183.
286. 149 I1. App. 3d at 120, 498 N.E.2d at 1184. But see SI Handling Sys., Inc. v.
Heisley, 658 F. Supp. 362, 370-71 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgment in trade secret litigation and rationalizing that "[t]his Court is at a loss to
understand why [under applicable Pennsylvania law] it should be necessary for [plaintiff]
to have executed a confidentiality agreement through which it obligates itself to nondisclosure of its own trade secrets.").
287. 759 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985).
288. Id. at 1063-64.
289. Id. at 1064. But see B.C. Ziegler & Co. v. Ehren, 141 Wis. 2d 19, 414 N.W.2d 48
(Wis. Ct. App. 1987), where scrap paper containing confidential customer information
was mistakenly delivered to a scrap dealer by the plaintiff's employees. In enjoining the
use of the information by a subsequent purchaser in a competing business, the court
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doubt whether the takers of the secret had fair notice of claim? Four
other cases simply recite that, because no security measures were
taken, no protection could be given. But does the fact that a temporary employment agency leaves information in unlocked files in a
public reception area without labeling the files confidential permit
employees to take the information? In Gordon Employment, Inc. v. Jewell, 29 as in American Wheel & Engineering Co. v. Dana Molded Products,
Inc. ,29 Palin Manufacturing Co. v. Water Technology, Inc.,292 and Delta
Filter Corp. v. Morin,2 9 3 the simple lack of security was fatal to a trade
secret claim.
Courts do not frame their examination of security in terms of
equitable notice, but evaluating commercial morality without recognizing the presence of such notice is difficult. The circular reasoning that embraces questions of public availability, adequate security,
and implied confidentiality might be avoided by reducing the issue
to one single inquiry: Was equitable notice met so that reasonable
people would know of the existence of a claimed trade secret? Perhaps the analytic confusion concerning application of trade secret
law in instances where there is no specific agreement would be lessened if the courts used principles of fairness and reasonableness, as
they so often do in other legal contexts.
3. Independent Discovery and Reverse Engineering.-Finally, consider the situation in which the claimant loses legal rights to the secret due to "independent discovery" or reverse engineering. Let us
first examine independent discovery. At law, trade secret protection
is not granted when the idea was independently developed as a result of research, creative thinking, or use of readily available information, usually described as ideas "in the public domain." This is
simply illustrated in cases such as Shumann v. IPCO Hospital Supply
Corp.,294 where the court held a device used for anchoring artificial
teeth to be in the public domain. 2 95 The motive of the alleged taker
played no negative role in deciding the equities once the court was
satisfied that the claimant publicly disclosed the device before revenoted that accident or employee negligence would not negate trade secret protection

where
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.

it otherwise would attach. Id. at 29-31, 414 N.W.2d at 53.
356 N.W.2d 738 (Minn. App. 1984).
132 Ill. App. 3d 205, 210, 476 N.E.2d 1291, 1295 (1985).
103 Ill. App. 3d 926, 931, 431 N.E.2d 1310, 1314 (1982).
108 A.D.2d 991, 993, 485 N.Y.S.2d 143, 145 (1985).
93 1l1.App. 3d 1053, 418 N.E.2d 161 (1981).
Id. at 1060, 418 N.E.2d at 166.
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lation to the alleged taker.2 9 6 These, of course, are not clean-cut
independent discovery cases, but fall into that group where the idea
coincides with the appearance of a former employee or contractor of
the claimant. Simply stated, the inventory of ideas in the public domain is generally enriched by reason of movement and a finding of
inadequate security, which is a form of implied public disclosure.
Of course, the truly independent discovery of an idea raises no
fairness issues, unlike situations where public disclosure results
from a failure in security. But the independent discovery defense is
not easily established morally because the cases generally reveal no
complete "independence" in the discovery. What distinguishable
mass of information retains its identity when others have access to
parts of it? Look at two similar cases with different results.
InJostens, Inc. v. National Computer Systems, Inc.2 9 7 the issue was a
computer system used to design and manufacture school rings. The
claimant charged that its former employees misappropriated data
used by a competing firm. The claimant acknowledged that its program used readily available hardware, but argued that its "customization" efforts were unique. 9 a In Rohm & Haas v. ADCO
Chemical Co., 2 99 a paint formula was the object of attention. The former employee convinced the trial court that the paint formula was a
product of his general knowledge and the skill and certain elements
known in the trade.3 0 0 InJostens the claimant lost, the court noting
that the assembly of the system did not require substantial research
or experimentation, but rather was the result of applying general
skill and knowledge of commonly available components to perform
the desired function . ° ' Further, combined with some breakdown in
security, 30 2 the independent thinker won. Yet in Rohm & Haas, the
appellate court overruled the trial court, pointing Out that even
though each and every element of the claimant's process was known
to the industry, the combination may be a secret if it produces a
superior paint product and others have been unable to duplicate the
formula. 0 3 Apparently, then, completely independent discovery
either is rarely seen or cases depending on such a defense are to be
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.
303.

Id.
318 N.W.2d 691 (Minn. 1982).
Id. at 694.
213 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 723 (D.NJ. 1981), rev'd, 689 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1982).
Id. at 753.
318 N.W.2d at 699.
The court found the claimant did not establish a policy of secrecy. Id. at 702.
689 F.2d at 433.
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judged on other grounds. From a fairness point of view, reconciling
the contrary results in these two cases is difficult.
But in those cases raising reverse engineering as a defense, the
ethical issue is more clear. In trade secret law, reverse engineering
is simply the legally permissible duplication of a product by analyzing its component parts. For example, a clever detective in a chemist's garment can expose a soft drink formula.30 4 Thus, the courts
will not protect the underlying secret formula from a competitor
who can discover the secret by inspection, disassembly, chemical
analysis, and the like. The rationale is that, in order to qualify for
protection in the first place, a trade secret is presumably not "readily disclosed by the product itself."' 30 5 Rather, the products should
be the "fruits of the use of a trade secret," ' 306 which arguably may
include, according to recent cases, specifications for a machine 30 7 or
tolerances for parts of an industrial drill used to make holes for explosives. 3 0 The law permits one, by reverse engineering, to peel.
away or remove eligibility from a trade secret. In effect, the courts
overlook the conduct involved once the conduct has reached its
goal, assuming that the conduct did not involve overt theft or "improper means. '30 9 The problem is that "improper means" closely
tracks existing legal theories, such as the boundaries of trespass law.
Simply illustrated, if a company stores a machine on its property, a
thief who takes the machine and discovers its secrets by reverse engineering is-clearly an illegal misappropriator.3
But the cases are
not so simply constructed. Observe the famous case of E.L DuPont
deATemours & Co. v. Christopher,3 1 l where the legal trespass was absent3 1 2 and gave the court some difficulty in labeling an "unethical
304. For a description of the efforts made by the Coca-Cola Company to avoid detection of its secret formulas, see Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 227 U.S.P.Q
(BNA) 18 (D. Del. 1985), quoted in Epstein & Levi, Protecting Trade Secret Information: A
Planfor Proactive Strategy, 43 Bus. LAw. 887, 888 n.7 (1988).

305. Colony Corp. of Am. v. Crown Glass Corp., 102 11. App. 3d 647, 649, 430
N.E.2d 225, 227 (1981).
306. Id.
307. Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool & Die Co.. 485 F. Supp. 410, 422 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
308. Drill Parts & Serv. Co. v. Joy Mfg. Co., 439 So. 2d 43, 49 (Ala. 1983).
309. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939). The RESTATEMENT gives a few examples of
"improper means" and states that "[i]n general they are means which fall below the
generally accepted standards of commercial morality and reasonable conduct." Id. comment f. Nowhere, however, is improper means specifically defined, leaving courts to
construct a standard according to their own view of law and fairness.
310. Id.
311. 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024, reh'g denied, 401 U.S.
967 (1971).
312. This point is implicit in the opinion. the court noting that the argument was
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trespass."3 1 3 Recall the aerial spy's argument that the airspace
above the claimant's plant was federally regulated, a no-man's land,
and therefore no trespass occurred. 14 The court disregarded the
niceties of trespass law, 3 15 instead taking the fair or moral position
that it was "bad show" to fly over another's plant and photograph
its secrets.3 1 6 One might almost call such behavior an "equitable or
moral trespass," which espouses a higher standard than the law
sometimes demands.
Is reverse engineering a fair defense to trade secret appropriation? Perhaps one major support for the doctrine is that it responds
to practical concerns,3 1 7 such as the difficulties of proof inherent in
determining to what extent reverse engineering assisted "independent" research. But that practical ground must be considered against
the potential for evil flowing from the free use of reverse engineering. Remember, many of the technological and scientific secrets are
garnered after great expenditure of time, money, and effort. Courts
relate to this in language such as "reverse engineering is but one
facet of the calculus of reasonableness ....
In conformity with our
emphasis on commercial morality . . . 'defendants should not be
permitted a competitive advantage from their normal costs of invention and duplication.' "1318
made, then saying no more on the point before deciding the case on other grounds. Id.
at 1014.
313. The court referred to the "unethical trespass" as obtaining trade secret information by "improper means" (quoting and explicitly adopting the language of the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment f, at 10 (1939)). 431 F.2d at 1016.
314. 431 F.2d at 1016.
315. See supra note 312.
316. The court's phrasing is particularly enlightening as to the extent it relied on fairness or morality:
To require DuPont to put a roof on the unfinished plant to guard its secret
[during construction of the plant] would impose an enormous expense to prevent nothing more than a school boy's trick. We introduce here no new or
radical ethic since our ethos has never given moral sanction to piracy. The
market place must not deviate from our mores. We should not require a person or corporation to take unreasonable precautions to prevent another from
doing that which he ought not do in the first place.... Clearly ... one of [the]
commandments [of what is commercially improper] does say "thou shalt not
appropriate a trade secret through deviousness under circumstances in which
countervailing defenses are not reasonably available."
431 F.2d at 1016-17.
317. The distinction is made between a physical device and a process. The device is
more easily reverse engineered, while processes many times are quite difficult to identify. Whether this difference should be honored is questionable when one moves beyond practical considerations as an element in ethical analysis. See Robison, supra note
5, at 35 1, where the difficulty in practice is described.
318. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Edel-Brown Tool & Die Co., 381 Mass. 1, 10, 407
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As a shortcut to innovation, reverse engineering appears unattractive when raising fairness issues. But some rather bad effects are
not so obvious. The result in the key lock case adds a new possibility of evil effects. Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg3 19 involved a claimant
that manufactured and sold a particularly secure tubular lock for
which duplicate keys were available only at the written request of the
registered owner. Otherwise, the owner of the lock would be required to have the lock picked and the tumbler configuration or key
code duplicated, a costly process. Enter the entrepreneur. This
party obtained a list of these key codes by advertising in trade journals and then published this list in a manual available to the general
public.3 2 The lock manufacturer sued to enjoin publication of the
manual.
In approving this entrepreneurial conduct, the court reasoned
that the defendants simply had taken reverse engineering a step further. 2 ' It found that since buying and deciphering the key codes
for all the locks would have been permissible, the question came
down to whether advertising for the combination was "improper
conduct. ' 32 2 Apparently raising no issues of fairness, the court
ruled that in the absence of a "confidential relationship" the behavior was legally proper.3 23 A simple balancing of the equities in the
case would have included some consideration of the very reason for
the secret: to provide security to those who bought the lock. If reverse engineering authorizes the destruction of the value of the secret itself, the rational underpinnings for reverse engineering,
particularly in a case such as this, are difficult to see.
Given approval in legal theory, only trespass cases expose reverse engineering to a fairness test. An excellent example of this
occurred in Elnickey Enterprises v. Spotlight Presents, Inc.3 24 There the
originator of "Rodney," an electronic robot-entertainer who had
appeared on television and at trade shows, sued his former sales
representative who marketed "Walter Ego," a robot-entertainer,
also appearing at trade shows. 32 5 A control panel containing joy
sticks regulated the motion of Rodney's head and body through an
N.E.2d 319, 326 (1980) (quoting Analogic Corp. v. Data Translation, Inc., 371 Mass.
643, 649, 358 N.E.2d 804, 808 (1976)).
319. 676 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1982).
320. Id. at 402.
321. Id. at 404.
322. Id.
323. 676 F.2d at 405.
324. 213 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 855 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).

325. Id. at 856.
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FM radio signal.3 2 6 The defendant duplicated the robot by observing video tapes of Rodney's performance and by employing a
mechanic to look inside him.3 2 7 This look was obtained, said the
court, by stealth.32 ' Therefore, although a reasonably skilled person
should have been able to construct a Rodney solely from observing
video tape or a live performance, the court ruled against the appropriators. "This case cannot be judged by what might have been.
[The defendants] wilfully stole the trade secret; it was arguably unnecessary to do so. But, having done so, the defendant cannot defeat plaintiff's right to relief simply because he could have reached
the same honestly."3'2 9 In effect, the court condemned the "charade" used by the defendants to get a good look at Rodney's
innards. 3 0
But reverse engineering is unevenly applied in jiidicial decisionmaking. It also is employed as a theoretical defense akin to the public domain argument, and as a timing device in fashioning a remedy.
Its theoretical use is found in the defendant's legal argument that
the product involves no secrets because its ingredients are easily
discovered. The argument rests upon the proposition that appropriation of readily available information is not commercially unethical. Courts accepted this type of reasoning in PermagrainProducts,
Inc. v. U.S. Mat & Rubber Co., 33 where disassembly and application
of a solvent easily separated the component parts of vinyl-laminated
wood, and in Colony Corp. of America v. Crown Glass Corp.,332 where the
defendant convinced the court that it could have copied the plaintiff's claimed secret design from the product itself, a glass candle
jar. This is the other side of the public information concept; that is,
a secret is not a secret if we all know or can easily discover it.
Courts are not always comfortable with this theoretical approach and point to the unfair savings of time, money and effort that
may accrue to the taker.3 33 In Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Novicky, the
trial court entered a twenty-year injunction against a former employee's use of trade secret information based upon testimony that
it took "in excess of 20 man-years and in excess of one million dol326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

Id.
Id. at 857-58.
213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 860, 863.
Id. at 863.
Id.
489 F. Supp. 108 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
102 I11.App. 3d 647, 430 N.E.2d 225 (1981).
Curtiss-JI'ight Corp., 381 Mass. at 10, 407 N.E.2d at 326.
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lars" to develop the process.3 3 4 But on remand, the court modified
the penalty to comport with evidence concerning the time it would
take to reverse engineer the process.3 " 5 So, too, in Anaconda Co. v.
Metric Tool & Die Corp.,336 the time to reverse engineer a misappropriated trade secret formed the duration of a preliminary injunction.
Improper behavior can be bridled only to the extent that the competitive process itself protects the secret.
V.

ETHICAL AND LEGAL PROFILE

The legal definition of a trade secret is very undiscriminating
and allows nearly all business ideas to qualify. Yet the value to society and the concomitant detriment flowing from such a rule are not
equal when examined against broad public policy. The protection
of a simple secret such as a customer list, for example, is relatively
harmless to society. The gatherer who has expended effort and
money to create the list can make a valid ethical claim.
Paradoxically, the case decisions do not reflect a large measure
of legal support for this view. In the twenty-two identifiable customer list cases, seventy-three percent were denied protection, generally on grounds that the information was public knowledge and
therefore was not eligible. Other general information fared only
slightly better, but in the technical-scientific decisions where the
ideas gathered took significant time, money, and effort, the claimants succeeded in nearly one-half of the cases. Yet in ruling on eligibility courts rarely commented on the time, money, and effort
expended. The courts also did not evaluate the commercial or public value of the idea seeking protection, an important ethical consideration under both the deontological and utilitarian approaches.
Once past the eligibility issue, courts apply certain legal tests to
decide trade secret cases. Here questions concerning the fairness,
or ethics, of the situation arise. Three concepts hold the judicial
mind captive: confidentiality, security, and reverse engineering.
These concepts frequently divert the court from dealing in a fair way
with trade secret cases. The judicial vehicles of confidentiality, se334. 745 F.2d 1423 (Fed. Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 470 U.S. 1047, on remand,

767 F.2d 901 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1083 (1986). See ato Wolfe v. Tuthill
Corp., 516 N.E.2d 1074 (Ind. App. 1987) (permanent injunction reversed and remanded, in part for a determination of duration considering possibilities of reverse engineering of trade secret).
335. 767 F.2d at 902.
336. 485 F. Supp. 410 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
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curity, and reverse engineering do not materially assist courts in
monitoring commercial morality.
The "confidentiality doctrine" is judicially biased and lethally
administered in favor of an employer and fails a basic test of fairness
or ethics. To inquire no further than whether a signature appears
on a nondisclosure agreement is hardly sufficient as the ethical evaluation of a bargain. This practice forfeits any inquiry into relevant
issues of over-reaching flowing from the traditional litmus test of
power, passion, and ignorance forming the basic tenets of a fair
agreement.
Even the judicial handling of security, that dominant theme in
trade secret cases, is puzzling. Courts minutely examine the ways in
which the company treated its "secrets," and an ultimate finding
that the security was sufficient substitutes for the missing nondisclosure agreement and the resulting "confidentiality." Simply put, security practices unilaterally impose a burden on the auditor and
viewer. The ethical puzzle reveals itself when the court decides inadequate security measures were taken to protect the secret. If, for
example, the claimant "just misses" in proving security, has the
claimant forfeited his or her claim? May the employee now freely
steal it? The cases say yes. From a public policy view, however, this
conclusion is questionable.
If, as is argued here, the function of security is to provide equitable notice of a claim, is not the issue simply whether the potential
taker was aware of the proprietary claim and its particular identity?
The deontologist, whose judgments are formed by reference to
principles of duty, probably would seek just that information. The
utilitarian, however, is not that quick to decide and would ask for
other uses of security. Security does have another potential function: it attempts to prevent secrets from becoming public knowledge and thereby flowing into the public domain. Most companies
keep their business essentially private, but not necessarily legally secure. The ethical issue should be squarely recognized: a review of
the cases leaves little doubt that the alleged taker had notice of the
proprietary claim and its nature. To determine theft on the degree
of security seems a poor public policy, using an otherwise technical
element to perform an equitable function. The courts might be
more effective if they resisted the temptation to employ the security
doctrine as a surrogate for an otherwise meaningful communication
with those exposed to the secret.
Finally, one must consider whether reverse engineering is an
example of appropriate commercial morality. Does it seem fair that
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simply the expense and effort of back-tracking by chemical analysis
or other methods is sufficient currency for taking another's effort
which resulted in a trade secret? Unless one accepts the premise
that ideas cannot be even temporarily claimed by another, the ethical underpinning of the doctrine of reverse engineering is weak.
Some cases can be morally justified on the practical grounds that the
legal system need not make any attempt to police the unpoliceable.
Perhaps that explains judicial approval of the practice, although the
cases provide little express evidence of such a consideration. The
doctrine of reverse engineering has been accepted without comment, and, sadly, without analysis. If one considers the fairness of
permitting protection of an idea that is difficult to copy while denying it tO one that is simple, however, genuine questions arise. The
cases do not focus on the time, money, and effort at risk in a reverse
engineering situation. Instead, courts choose to let the market
forces prevail except, on occasion, when an offensive type of trespass facilitated the taking.
Are trade secret questions resolved along lines of commercial
morality? Does the proverbial judicial hunch entertain a strong
component of an intention to do right to society and the parties?
The tentative answer to these questions is that the somewhat mechanistic application of the trade secret rules inartfully polices commercial morality and fails to produce fair or ethical results in many
cases. Courts pay little attention to the search for the "good person" in trade secret disputes as they do, for example, in equity
cases. The reason for this may be that the legal elements of a cause
of action for trade secret appropriation do not deliver practical ethical guidelines for the courts if their goal is to enforce commercial
morality.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Can one steal. trade secrets ethically? Given the complicated
nature of the concept and the struggle among competing and highly
legitimate policy interests, it would seem so. The decisions of the
past eleven years reveal no serious search for the fairness between
the contestants for the use of those business ideas called trade
secrets. The judicial opinions determine trade secret cases by certain mechanisms that affect the fairness question: first, applying
legal rules which decree ideas of a technical or scientific nature almost always are properly protectable, while other ideas are generally wanting; second, the existence of a confidentiality principle or
doctrine, which unabashedly honors contracts of adhesion, unen-
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cumbered by any judicial examination as to the fairness of the bargain; third, the dominance of a highly technical but critical test of
security, which performs the dual function of defining the secret and
providing a form of unilateral notice of one's claim to a trade secret,
but seems to possess no ethical component in its application; and,
finally, applying the remarkable doctrine called reverse engineering,
which authorizes taking where the claimant is unlucky enough to
have developed a business idea discoverable by back-tracking.
Therefore, trade secret cases exhibit no major theme of fairness
as is advertised in many judicial opinions. Rather, they record a judicial product that results from applying legal principles ill-suited
for monitoring commercial reality. This is especially true when
dealing with a set of complex social issues such as surround the protection of trade secrets.
If courts wish to further honesty and fair dealing in this area,
the mechanistic elements used to determine appropriation claims
should be given secondary importance. Confidentiality, for example, cannot be based on contract principles alone. Nor can secrecy
be measured accurately by predetermined external manifestations.
Instead, courts should be encouraged to police fairness and morality
as they have for centuries, through equity. The combination of understood principles, the maxims of equity, and judicial experience
offer the appropriate environment for a trade secret law that purports to monitor morality.

